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Plaintiff Cities
Sarah L. Swan*
When cities are involved in litigation, it is most often as
defendants. However, in the last few decades, cities have emerged as
aggressive plaintiffs, bringing forward hundreds of mass-tort style
claims. From suing gun manufacturersfor the scourge of gun violence,
to bringing actions against banks for the consequences of the subprime
mortgage crisis, to initiatingclaims againstpharmaceuticalcompanies
for opioid-relateddeaths and injuries, plaintiffcities are using litigation
to pursue the perpetratorsof the social harms that have devastated their
constituents and their communities.
Many courts and commentators have criticized these plaintiff
city claims on numerous grounds. They argue that, as a doctrinal
matter, cities lack standing, fail to meet causation standards, and
stretch causes of action like public nuisance beyond all reasonablelimits.
Further, they argue that, as a theoretical matter, plaintiff cities are
impermissibly using litigationas regulation, overstepping their limited
authority as "creatures of the state," and usurping the political and
legislativeprocess. This Article demonstrates that each of these critiques
is mistaken. Plaintiffcity claims are legally, morally, and sociologically
legitimate. And, as a practicalmatter, they are financiallyfeasible even
for cash-strapped or bankrupt cities. Moving beyond mere economic
accounting, though, plaintiff city claims have value of a different sort:
for plaintiff cities, litigation is a form of state building. By serving as
plaintiffs and seeking redress for the harms that impact a city's most
vulnerable residents, plaintiff cities are demanding recognition not just
for those impacted constituents, but also for themselves, as distinct and
meaningful polities. In so doing, plaintiff cities are renegotiating the
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practical and theoretical meaning of cities within the existing political
order, and opening up new potentialpaths for urban socialjustice.
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INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, city attorneys have two basic roles.' First, they
advise city officials. 2 Second, they defend cities when legal claims are
brought against them. 3 And claims are indeed brought, many and
often. 4 Because they occupy the frontline between citizen and state,
cities are very frequently sued, on a wide variety of grounds.5 The
perpetual presence of cities as litigative defendants can create the
impression that cities are "intractable defenders of awful power
structures,"6 who "only. . . deny, rather than support, the rights and

interests of their residents."7
But cities have another face, too. Despite the "paradigm in many
public law offices . . . to be principally defensive," in the last thirty years
8
or so, some cities have resolved to become "so much more than that."

These cities have added a new legal role to their roster: that of plaintiff.
In contrast to their standard defensive litigative posture (but
complementing their well-publicized efforts to advance socially
progressive regulation like ordinances raising the minimum wage or
prohibiting fracking 9), cities have been bringing forward hundreds of
mass-tort style claims seeking redress for the widespread harms that
substantially injure themselves and their constituents.1 0 Cities like San
1.

Kathleen S. Morris, Cities Seeking Justice: Local Government Litigation in the Public

Interest, in How CITIES WILL SAVE THE WORLD: URBAN INNOVATION IN THE FACE OF POPULATION
FLOWS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 189 (Ray Brescia & John Travis Marshall

eds., 2016).
2.

Id.

3.

Id.

See, e.g., Mike Maciag, From Police Shootings to Playground Injuries, Lawsuits Drain
4.
http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov(Nov. 2016),
Cities' Budgets, GOVERNING
government-lawsuits-settlements.html [https://perma.cc/W65L-NK49].
Morris, supra note 1, at 201.
5.
Id.
6.
7.
Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, Associational Standing for Cities, 47 CONN. L. REV. 59, 96
(2014).
Michael Hiltzik, City Attorney Takes Aim at Big Banks, L.A. TIMES (June 6, 2014, 10:34
8.
[http://perma.ccl
www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-20140608-column.htmls
PM),
2Y8V-YZUR] (quoting Los Angeles City Attorney Mike Feuer).
For a discussion of these ordinances and their relationship to state legislation, see David
9.
A. Graham, Red State, Blue City, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.comlmagazine/
archive/2017/03/red-state-blue-city/513857/ [https://perma.cclS827-FXBM]. For a discussion of
these initiatives and the overall balance of city power, see Richard C. Schragger, The Political
Economy of City Power, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 91, 91-92 (2017), which argues that "cities are
flexing their policy-making muscle. Cities have been adopting ordinances in areas as diverse as
environmental protection and health care and asserting themselves into policy spaces often
considered exclusive to the state or the federal governments."
10. After the tobacco litigation, municipal securities litigation became very popular as well.
See Joe Palazzolo, More Cities Suit Up for Legal Actions, WALL ST. J. (May 3, 2016, 4:11 PM),
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Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York now have specialized units
within their law departments devoted to bringing these claims and
developing their role as plaintiff cities.1 1 Other less well-resourced cities
pursue such claims as well, though often on a more ad hoc basis or
through partnering with private law firms. 12
The first fledgling plaintiff city claims began in the 1980s, but
they were largely hidden within the broader auspices of claims brought
by state attorneys general. 13 In the tobacco and asbestos litigation of
that era, a small number of cities joined the high-profile and highpowered consortiums of states litigating these claims. Approximately
ten years later, in the mid-1990s, cities matured into their own
litigative force, as a multitude of plaintiff cities advanced controversial
claims against the gun industry. Nearly a decade later, the federal
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act brought an abrupt end to
that line of litigation, 14 but plaintiff cities refocused to target a new
https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-cities-suit-up-for-legal-actions-1462218870
[https://perma.cc/
9EYZ-7ATP]. Cities have also been bringing more constitutional claims on behalf of their
constituents. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the
Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218 (2006) (examining Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95
P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004), where San Francisco challenged California's same-sex marriage ban).
11. Morris, supra note 1, at 190. Other cities, like Buffalo, New York; Central Falls, Idaho;
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Washington, D.C., have also created these units. See Divisions,
CITY BUFF.,
https://www.ci.buffalo.ny.us/Home/CityDepartments/LawDepartment/Divisions
(last visited Mar. 18, 2018) [https://perma.cclW6WN-SXL3]; Central Falls Affirmative Litigation,
CITY CENT. FALLS, www.centralfallsri.us/affirmativelitigation (last visited Mar. 18, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/YHP9-DJER]; Affirmative & General Litigation, CITY PHILA., www.phila.gov/
law/litigation/Pages/GeneralLitigation.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/54LZCHPY]; Rachel Dovey, D.C. Renters Get More Legal Help for "HousingJustice" Cases, NEXT CITY
(Feb.
27,
2017),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/dc-renters-legal-help-housing-justice
[https://perma.cc/6X83-WP4C]. Chicago corporation counsel, Edward Siskel, told the media that
Chicago was creating "an 'affirmative litigation' unit" because "[i]f the federal government is not
going to play their role in enforcement, we're going to step into that void and do what we need to
do to protect the residents of Chicago, to protect the economic lifeblood of the city of Chicago
against any threat to it." Chicago to Form Legal Unit to Sue Corporations,CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 1, 2017,
1:00 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-bc-il--chicago-suing-corporations-20171130story.html [http://perma.cc/MRQ8-K9WJ] (internal quotation marks omitted). Other cities, like
Providence, Rhode Island, for example, engage in affirmative litigation without a separate
department. See Palazzolo, supra note 10. Some cities have also partnered with law schools to aid
in affirmative litigation. San Francisco has partnered with Yale Law School and Berkeley Law
School, and Detroit has partnered with the University of Michigan. See Morris, supra note 1, at
190; Katie Vloet, DLaw: Class Explores Affirmative Litigation Opportunities for Detroit, LAW
QUADRANGLE, https://www.quadrangle.law.umich.edulspring2017/umichlaw/dlaw-class-explores-

affirmative-litigation-opportunities-for-detroit (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
D9UA-L4XC].
12. See infra Part III.
13. See Henry Weinstein & Maura Dolan, San FranciscoSues 6 Tobacco Firms, L.A. TIMES
(June
7,
1996),
articles.latimes.com/1996-06-07/news/mn-12618lsan-francisco-tobacco
[https://perma.cclBW2G-AA9G].
14. 15 U.S.C. § 7901 (2012).
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mass harm: lead paint. More recently, in the last ten years or so, a new
wave of plaintiff city litigation has expanded to include claims against
the largest oil companies for the harms of climate change, claims
against banks and other financial entities for the consequences of the
subprime mortgage crisis, and claims against pharmaceutical
companies for the carnage wrought by the opioid epidemic.
The early plaintiff city claims did not fare well. Most were
defeated on doctrinal grounds like lack of standing, failure to show
causation, or nonfulfillment of the public nuisance cause of action.
These issues still derail many plaintiff city claims. But some of the more
recent plaintiff city cases have achieved substantial in-court and out-ofcourt victories. Despite these recent successes (or perhaps because of
them), plaintiff city detractors continue to impugn these actions,
arguing that they are doctrinally and politically suspect. In the
doctrinal register, standing and causation continue to receive vehement
critique, and in the political register, critics mainly argue that plaintiff
cities are usurping the democratic process by regulating through
litigation what they cannot regulate directly, thus grossly overstepping
the appropriate city-state allotment of power.
These criticisms arise mostly piecemeal in court cases and
commentary,1 5 and scholarship has yet to fully grapple with them. In
fact, scholarship has not yet offered a comprehensive descriptive and
normative account of the plaintiff city trend itself. 16 This Article is the
first to fill that gap. After descriptively accounting for the plaintiff city
phenomenon, this Article addresses the controversies surrounding
these claims and demonstrates that plaintiff city claims are a legitimate
15. Two articles not specifically about cities nevertheless offer criticisms relevant to plaintiff
city claims. See Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77
TEMP. L. REV. 825 (2004); Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys
General and Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913 (2008).
16. There is a smattering of scholarship focused on discrete issues related to city litigation.
For scholarship on city standing, see, for exanmple, Raymond H. Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs and
Private Harms: The Standing of Municipalitiesin Climate Change, Firearms,and FinancialCrisis
Litigation, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 7, 21 (2010) [hereinafter Brescia, On Public
Plaintiffs] (discussing how plaintiff cities can attain standing in gun, mortgage, and environmental
litigation); Raymond H. Brescia, When Cities Sue: The Standing of Municipalities in Nuisance
Litigation to Combat Climate Change, in GREENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT: LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR
PROMOTING SUSTAINABILITY, EFFICIENCY, AND FISCAL SAVINGS 319 (Keith H. Hirokawa & Patricia

E. Salkin eds., 2012) (discussing standing in environmental cases); and Caruso, supra note 7
(discussing associational standing for cities). There are also some helpful short pieces on the
general topic. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 1, at 190 (arguing that cities could help "bolster civil
law enforcement"); Gail Rubin, Taking the Offensive: New York City's Affirmative Suits, 53 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 491, 493 (2008) (describing New York City's affirmative litigation docket); Laura L.
Gavioli, Comment, Who Should Pay: Obstaclesto Cities in UsingAffirmative Litigation as a Source
of Revenue, 78 TUL. L. REV. 941 (2004) (outlining city affirmative litigation and offering the views
of some city attorneys general).
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litigative activity: legally, morally, and sociologically. And, as a
practical matter, this litigation is financially feasible, even in the
current economic climate of cash-strapped or bankrupt cities. Moving
beyond mere economic measurement, though, plaintiff city claims have
another sort of value: they have political currency. In short, plaintiff
cities use litigation as a form of state building. By serving as plaintiffs
and seeking redress for the harms that impact a city's most vulnerable
residents, plaintiff cities are defining and demanding recognition not
just for those impacted constituents, but also for themselves, as distinct
and meaningful polities. In so doing, plaintiff cities are renegotiating
the practical and theoretical possibilities of cities in the political order
and opening up new potential paths for urban justice.
Part I describes the rise of plaintiff cities.1 7 It sketches out the
most common plaintiff city claims and the nature of the harms
underlying them. This descriptive account reveals three important
insights. First, plaintiff city claims usually target public health injuries.
Second, these public health harms tend to have their most significant
impact on minority or vulnerable populations. Finally, these harms are
usually forms of "slow violence."1 8 They tend to accumulate gradually,
leaving a lapse between the beginning of the injurious activity and the
full manifestation of the harm.19
Part II addresses the main criticisms of plaintiff city claims, and
demonstrates that plaintiff city litigation is legally, morally, and
sociologically legitimate. Legally, most plaintiff city claims can meet
standing requirements through a number of potential paths, including
statutory standing, direct injury standing, associational standing, or
special public nuisance standing. And, although the slow violence and
collective nature of plaintiff city claims can create complications for
causation, many plaintiff city claims can nevertheless meet causation
requirements. Morally or politically, arguments that plaintiff city
claims unjustly bind dissenters, or undemocratically amount to
litigation as regulation, are best answered through analogies to other
contexts, most notably state-driven public interest litigation.

17. Technically, cities are "public corporations," that is, "not-for-profit, publicly funded
corporate entities" that "essentially come into being by applying to state governments for
permission to exist." Morris, supra note 1, at 191. In the tradition of much local government
scholarship, this Article uses the term "city" broadly, to refer to most "general-purpose
governments below the state level," which would also generally include counties. Barron, supra
note 10, at 2221 n.6.
18.

ROB NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR 2 (2013) ("By

slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed
destruction that is dispersed beyond time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not
viewed as violence at all.").
19. Id.
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Sociologically, the "tort reform" movement has generally succeeded in
impugning civil litigation as a whole, but litigation is eventually
deemed acceptable and worthwhile if the information-forcing function
reveals misconduct, as it has in many plaintiff city claims.
Part III considers the relevance of plaintiff city claims in this
current time of fiscal crisis for many municipalities. It asserts that
plaintiff city claims are financially feasible, even for fiscally distressed
cities. Notably, in fact, the harms that plaintiff cities allege in these
suits are often at least partly responsible for the cities' precarious
financial position in the first place.
In addition to their economic value, plaintiff city claims also
have political worth. Part IV argues that plaintiff city claims are a form
of litigation as state building. Through these claims, plaintiff cities are
establishing themselves as entities responsible for and capable of
achieving justice for their populations. They are both constructing their
underlying polities as ones rooted in inclusivity and diversity, and
constructing themselves as significant and meaningful political
entities.
I. CITIES BECOME PLAINTIFFS

Although cities have brought one-off, piecemeal litigation to
advance their interests and those of their constituents since their first
charters were established (including constitutional claims and other
types of public interest litigation 20), cities started targeting systemic,.
mass-tort style harms in the 1980s, first through the asbestos litigation
and then through the tobacco cases. 2 1 Both the asbestos litigation and
the tobacco litigation were mainly state-driven enterprises, with cities
20. For a descriptive sampling of these cases, see Morris, supra note 1. Californian cities,
because of special authorization they have from the state of California, bring a particularly wide
array of cases, including actions against banks for selling fraudulent products or engaging in
consumer-related misconduct, against companies that dump toxic waste, and against companies
whose products negatively affect children. Id. Los Angeles has also sued hospitals for patient
dumping, the practice of transporting indigent and mentally ill patients to the middle of an area
like skid row and leaving them there untreated, often wearing only hospital gowns and with no
available money or resources. See Melinda Carstensen, Patient Dumping in America: Hospitals
Discharging Sick Homeless Back onto the Street, Fox NEWS (May 14, 2015),
http://foxnews.com/healthl2015/05/14/patient-dumping-in-america-hospitals-dischargin-sickhomeless-back-onto-street.html [https://perma.cdJC9T-HVUJB]. In the wake of the Donald Trump
presidency, cities have also been litigating over issues like sanctuary cities. See Vikram David
Amar, Federalism Friction in the First Year of the Trump Presidency, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
401, 403 (2018).
21. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass ProductsLiability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
741 (2002); see also Richard A. Daynard, How "Implied Express Preemption"Happened, What it
Means to Trial Lawyers, and Why it Matters, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 475, 480 (2010).
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playing only a relatively minor role, 22 but the twinned successes of these
two lines of litigation (tobacco, for example, resulted in one of the
largest settlements in American history 23) meant that a handful of
pioneering plaintiff cities received substantial settlement funds. 24 The
tobacco and asbestos litigation thus signalled to municipalities that
plaintiff city litigation could be a potentially viable route for cities
looking to address systemic, widespread public health harms and to
recover the costs associated with them. 25

A. The Litigation
1. Guns
Buoyed by the successes in the tobacco and asbestos litigation,
plaintiff cities mobilized and initiated litigation against another
systemic, widespread, and devastating public harm: gun violence. 26
Gun violence has been one of the most significant public harms to
plague American society, "[w]hether measured by mortality or
morbidity statistics, by cost to society, or by sheer grief and disruption"

22.

Forty-six states participated in the $206 billion Master Settlement Agreement, along with

a handful of cities and counties. PAUL NOLET'E, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL AND NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 1-2 (2015). The localities

which were part of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement included New York City, San Francisco,
and Los Angeles, as well as Cook County, Illinois, and Erie County, New York. Gavioli, supra note
16, at 947.
23. David M. Cutler et al., The Economic Impacts of the Tobacco Settlement, 21 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1, 1 (2002). When it was entered into, the settlement's estimated value was
$105 billion. Id.
24. New York City, for instance, received more than $130 million and "is the single largest
recipient of asbestos bankruptcy recoveries." Rubin, supra note 16, at 493.
25. Fox Butterfield, Results in Tobacco Litigation Spur Cities to File Gun Suits, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 24, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/24/us/results-in-tobacco-litigation-spur-cities-tofile-gun-suits.html [https://perma.cclRQ4F-D445]. The successful asbestos suits were rooted in the
property ownership rights of municipalities and school boards. The suits that instead "claimed
that the manufacture and distribution of asbestos products constituted a nuisance . . . were
rejected by most courts." Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 207, 238-39 (2012). Also, the most successful tobacco litigation, that in which states sued for
health care cost reimbursement, was premised on "equitable grounds such as unjust enrichment"
and on state consumer protection statutes. Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation:A Tentative
Assessment, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 337 (2001). Prior to the state tobacco claims, individual suits
against tobacco companies had been almost unanimously unsuccessful: of the approximately eight
hundred claims filed in state courts in the forty years between 1954 and 1994, plaintiffs succeeded
at the trial level only twice, and neither success survived appeal. See Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco
Litigation: Smoke, Mirrorsand Public Policy, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 190-91 (2000).
26. Butterfield, supra note 25.
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to communities. 27 Since cities bear much of the economic cost associated
with such violence, and witness the human and social cost for victims
and their families, they have long sought solutions for this problem. In
the 1990s, given the already-recognized overwhelming lobbying power
of the gun industry, litigation appeared to be a good option. 28
In 1998,29 New Orleans brought the first plaintiff city gun suit,
using product liability laws to claim that gun manufacturers had
"defectively designed" their firearms because they lacked easily
implementable safety mechanisms like child safety locks. 30 Shortly
after New Orleans filed, Chicago brought its own plaintiff city gun suit,
this time framing the claim as one of public nuisance, not product
liability. 31 An onslaught of plaintiff city suits followed: nearly two years
after the New Orleans and Chicago filings, thirty local governments had
filed gun litigation claims. 32
The bulk of these claims were dismissed,3 3 and the few that did
survive were eventually terminated by legislation. 34 In addition to the
27.

Julie Samia Mair et al., A PublicHealth Perspectiveon Gun Violence Prevention, in SUING

THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL & MASS TORTS 39, 39

(Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2006).
28. Id.
29. Howard M. Erichson, Private Lawyers, PublicLawsuits: Plaintiffs'Attorneysin Municipal
Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 27, at 129, 137.
30. Ausness, supra note 15, at 840. New Orleans sought damages for "the costs of police
protection, emergency services, medical care, lost tax revenue, and other losses attributable to
gun-related violence." Id. It also sought "injunctive relief in the form of design standards and
marketing restrictions." Timothy D. Lytton, Introduction: An Overview of Lawsuits Against the
Gun Industry, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supranote 27, at 1, 3.
31. Erichson, supra note 29, at 130. The case was City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No.
98 CH 15596, 2000 WL 35509506 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 15, 2000), rev'd, 785 N.E.2d 16 (111. App. Ct.
2002), rev'd, 821 N.E.2d 1099 (111. 2004).
32. Michael I. Krauss, Public Services Meet Private Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 3 (2007).
States and other governmental actors also subsequently became more active in this area. At the
state level, in 1999, the New York and Connecticut Attorneys General started investigating
"several" gun manufacturers. The same year, at the federal level, the then-Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development (Andrew Cuomo) and the then-President (Bill Clinton) "jointly announced
that they were planning a lawsuit against gun manufacturers on behalf of 3,200 public housing
authorities across the country, based on the notion that the actions of gun manufacturers had
increased federal expenditures." Paul Nolette, Law Enforcement as Legal Mobilization:Reforming
the PharmaceuticalIndustry Through Government Litigation, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 123, 143
(2015).
33. A few claims settled, though sometimes the success was more regulatory than
compensatory. San Francisco's case, for example, cost $1 million to bring, but "[iun a settlement,
gun distributors paid only $70,000 to the dozen cities and counties [involved]." Lee Romney,
Activism Defines S.F. City Attorney's Office, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2004), articles.latimes.com/2004/
mar/23/locallme-cityatty23 [https://perma.cc/B3V2-ETCS]. However, the distributors and dealers
also "agreed to certain restrictions on sales and better training to prevent firearm sales to
criminals." Id.
34. As one commentator noted, "One problem is that powerful interests, when poked with the
stick of a municipal lawsuit, sometimes can get higher government entities to snarl back on their
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many state bills that were enacted to prohibit such lawsuits, 35 in 2005
Congress passed the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act,
which effectively foreclosed nearly all municipal civil suits against the
gun industry. 36
2. Lead
Before Congress killed the gun litigation, plaintiff cities had
already begun litigating against another public health harm: lead
paint. 37 Lead paint remains "the most significant childhood
environmental health problem"

38

in many states, as even very low

levels of exposure cause decreased IQ, reduced attention span, damage
to reproductive organs, and neurological damage. 3 9 Lead poisoning has
no cure; "once the damage is done, it is irreversible." 40
To stop childhood lead paint poisoning and remediate tainted
properties, many cities and other local public authorities sued lead
paint companies in the early 2000s, alleging that the lead paint
companies knew as early as the 1920s or 1930s of the dangers lead paint
behalf." Hiltzik, supra note 8. A similar phenomenon occurred in relation to obesity, when
"[r]elatively quick action by many state legislatures immunized the food industry to tort lawsuits
seeking obesity-related damages." Paul A. Diller, Obesity Prevention Policies at the Local Level:
Tobacco's Lessons, 65 ME. L. REV. 459, 460 (2013).
35. Louisiana and Georgia are examples of states that enacted gun litigation prevention
statutes. In Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1 (La. 2001), the city unsuccessfully
challenged the Louisiana statute.
36. Gary, Indiana, has had some success in arguing around the statute's edges. See Morris,
supra note 1, at 200-01. And while city attorneys may have lost the litigation battle, they continue
to fight the larger war. Today, "prosecutors from 30 major cities" have formed "a new coalition,"
Prosecutors Against Gun Violence, to "exchang[e] expertise and tactics" on how best to address the
"urgent public health and safety issue" of gun violence. This coalition is cochaired by Los Angeles
City Attorney Mike Feuer. Editorial Board, When ProsecutorsAlign on Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/opinion/when-prosecutors-align-on-guns.html
[https://perma.cc/WP7L-D5UT].
37. Cases included: City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2007);
City of Chicago v. American Cynamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126 (111. App. Ct. 2005); In re Lead Paint
Litig., 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007) (where the plaintiff was the city of Newark); City of Milwaukee v.
NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). Columbus City (Ohio), Philadelphia
(Pennsylvania), Houston (Texas), and a number of other municipalities in Ohio also filed suit. Eric
Tucker, R.I Lead Paint Loss Gives Industry Huge Win, USA TODAY (July 6, 2008),
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-07-06-1044394103_x.htm?csp=34
[https://perma.cc/ZJ8Y-CZNT].'
38. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124125 (West 2018).
39. Childhood Lead Poisoning, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 11-12 (2010), http://apps.who.int/
iris/bitstream10665/136571/1/9789241500333_eng.pdf
[https.//perma.cc/PWL2-WK4D];
Erin
Schumaker & Alissa Scheller, Lead PoisoningIs Still a PublicHealth Crisisfor African-Americans,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2015, 1:48 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/13/blackchildren-at-risk-for-lead-poisoning-_n_7672920.html (last updated Dec. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
TL2C-T58R].
40. Schumaker & Scheller, supra note 39.
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posed, but deliberately hid this information.4 1 Like the gun litigation,
most of this initial plaintiff city litigation against lead manufacturers
failed. 42 However, in 2013, one plaintiff city claim, involving a
consortium of ten Californian cities and counties, had a remarkable
victory, receiving a $1.15 billion damage award. 43 In 2017, the appellate
court affirmed that verdict. 44 While the lead paint companies have
indicated that they will pursue a further appeal, 45 the holding and tenor
of the judgment may invigorate other cities still fighting on this and
other fronts.46

41. Ausness, supra note 15, at 853-54; see also infranote 42.
42. Ausness, supra note 15, at 854. The early litigation was described as "uniformly
unsuccessful." Id. In 2007, though, it looked like a state-led suit had managed a victory when a
Rhode Island jury issued a $2.4 billion verdict against a number of lead paint companies. Rhode
Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. PC 99-5226, 2007 WL 711824 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007), rev'd
in part, 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008); see also Abha Bhattarai, Rhode Island Court Throws Out Jury
Finding in Lead Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/02/
business/02paint.html [https://perma.cc/B6SN-NVML] ("Cleanup costs in Rhode Island had been
estimated at $2.4 billion."). The Rhode Island Supreme Court overturned this verdict a year later.
951 A.2d at 452-58. The Rhode Island suit itself was an exception to the typical state-level
response to lead paint, which did not use litigation. Instead, "most state attorneys general [were]
cautious about getting involved with lead paint." Alan Greenblatt, Lead Into Gold?, GOVERNING
http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/Lead-Gold.html
2006),
(May
[https://perma.cclDM6F-NDFS]. Indeed, "[i]n 2003, 47 of the 50 AGs signed an agreement with
paint makers calling for tougher warning labels about the danger of stirring up lead paint dust in
home renovation" and "[t]hat seemed to dampen their enthusiasm for further litigation." Id.
43. People v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 1-00-CV-788657, 2014 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1426, at *189
(Jan. 7, 2014).
44. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 598 (Ct. App. 2017).
However, the court did narrow the verdict slightly, to cover only houses constructed before 1951,
not 1978. Id. at 546-47. According to one media report about the decision, "It isn't clear how much
the abatement fund would be reduced by the order, though an attorney for the plaintiff counties
and cities estimated that the companies still would be on the hook for about $600 million." Michael
Hiltzik, In Landmark Ruling, Court Orders Paint Companies to Pay to Clean Lead Paint out of
California Homes, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017, 1:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/
la-fi-hiltzik-lead-paint-ruling-20171115-story.html [https://perma.cc/N2NS-3SJV].
45. See Hiltzik, supra note 44.
46. Id. Baltimore is one such city. It is currently urging state legislators to pass the Maryland
Lead Poisoning Recovery Act, which would allow the city to sue lead paint companies based on a
market-share liability theory, rather than the standard "personal injury"-style causation
requirement. See Jack Chavez, Lead-PaintBill Would Let Baltimore Sue for Past Damages, U.S.
NEWS (Mar. 8, 2017, 3:34 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/marylandlarticles/2017[https://perma.cclU8RE-TSEA].
03-08/ead-paint-bill-would-let-baltimore-sue-for-past-damages
For an example of the opposite dynamic, where the state is seeking to pass legislation that would
limit a plaintiff city suit, see Carole Carlson, Senate Bill Targets Gary Gun Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB.
(Feb. 16, 2015, 7:42 PM), www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/news/ct-ptb-gary-gunsuit-bill-focus-st-0217-20150216-story.html [https://perma.cc/6UBQ-FKPX].
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3. Environmental Harms
The success of the California counties and cities in the recent
lead paint appeal may impact another active area of plaintiff city
litigation: litigation targeting climate change and other environmental
harms. 47 Advancements in the science of climate change, new
information about how much oil companies knew and how long they
knew it for, and the ever-growing cost of responding to climate change
have prompted cities like San Francisco, Oakland, and Imperial Beach
to sue the five largest oil conglomerates for their role in creating climate
change. 48
In January 2018, New York City joined this group of plaintiff
cities, announcing that it would be both suing the oil companies and
divesting its approximately $5 billion of pension investments from
them. 49 This announcement has been heralded as a watershed moment,
with many environmentalists noting the fact that the "financial capital
of the world"50 is suing and divesting from fossil fuel companies is "one
of the . ..

most important moments in [the] 30-year fight" to stop

climate change5 1 and "should be a galvanizing moment for cities around
the world." 5 2

Water pollution is also a major area of plaintiff city litigation. 53
For instance, San Jose, Berkley, and Oakland have initiated suits
against Monsanto for polluting the bay water of their surrounding areas
with polychlorinated biphenyls, which "have been linked to cancer,
neurotoxic and mutagenic health effects." 54 San Francisco Bay, San
47. Hiltzik, supra note 44.
48. Corinne Ramey & Mara Gay, New York City Sues Oil Companies over Climate Change,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2018, 4:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/city-sues-oil-companies-overclimate-change-1515607107 [https://perma.cc/6R59-K3SW].
49. Chris Mooney & Dino Grandoni, New York City Sues Shell, ExxonMobil and Other Oil
Companies over Climate Change, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2018/0 1/10/new-york-city-sues-shell-exxonmobil-and-other-oilmajors-over-climate-change/utm-term=.f743alefab4O [https://perma.cc/QA5C-6WFY].
50. Karen Savage, New York City Files Climate Lawsuit Against Five Biggest Oil Companies,
CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/01/10/newyork-city-climate-lawsuit-liability-bill-de-blasio/ [https://perma.cc/WV-U7-ZG9B] (quoting activist
Naomi Klein).
51. Mooney & Grandoni, supra note 49 (quoting environmental activist Bill McKibben).
52. Savage, supra note 50 (quoting Annie Leonard, the executive director of Greenpeace).
53. Des Moines is suing neighboring counties for polluting the water with "[t]oo much
nitrate," which "can be a health risk, especially for infants under the age of 6 months." Dan
Charles, Iowa's Largest City Sues over Farm FertilizerRunoff in Rivers, NPR (Jan. 12, 2015, 3:26
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/01/12/376139473/iowas-largest-city-sues-overfarm-fertilizer-runoff-in-rivers [https://perma.cc/2NH3-G366].
54. Ed Barrena,
City Sues Monsanto, E. COUNTY MAG.
(Mar. 18, 2015),
http://www.eastcountymagazine.org/city-sues-monsanto [https://perma.cc/4BMS-PYH3].
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Diego, Spokane, Seattle, Long Beach,5 5 and Portland5 6 have also sued
in this regard. Similarly, in the early 2000s, many plaintiff cities sued
companies for the damaging effects of the gas additive methyl tertiary
butyl ether ("MTBE") on water supplies.5 7
4. Subprime Mortgages
Plaintiff cities have also targeted the financial institutions
responsible for the subprime mortgage crisis.5 8 The subprime mortgage
crisis brutalized both the physical and the metaphorical landscapes of
hundreds of U.S. cities. 59 In addition to the financial ruin of individuals
and families, 60 cities were stuck "bearing the brunt of the fallout from
[this] crisis." 6 1 Foreclosures caused "massive property devaluations" 62
resulting in a plundered tax base for cities, and the abandoned
properties themselves demanded extensive city resources in the form of

55. "[S]even cities have hired the Dallas firm Baron & Budd and the San Diego firm Gomez
Trial Attorneys. The defendants - Monsanto, Solutia and Pharmacia - call the cases a 'super tort.'"
John O'Brien, Monsanto Fighting 'Super Tort' Brought by West Coast Cities and Trial Lawyers,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2016/06/22/headline/
FORBES (June 22, 2016),
#3e62a18667ad [https://perma.cc/U-HG5-AK3V].
56. Port of Portland v. Monsanto Co., No. 3:17-cv-00015-PK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156369
(D. Or. Sept. 22, 2017).
57. The exact nature of the MTBE harm was unclear: it was said that at best, it made water
stink and taste terrible, and at worst, it caused cancer. Elizabeth Thornburg, Public as Private
and Private as Public: MTBE Litigation in the United States, in CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT: How
CULTURE, ECONOMICS AND POLITICs SHAPE COLLECTIVE LITIGATION 342, 344 (Deborah R. Hensler

et al. eds., 2016). Municipal water districts and state governments were plaintiffs that sued many
major oil and gas companies, which led to a settlement in 2008. New York City sued ExxonMobil,
the case went to trial, and they got $104.7 million in compensatory damages. Id.
58. Of course, cities are not the only entities seeking to redress the consequences of the
subprime mortgage crisis through litigation. State attorneys general have initiated claims alleging
violation of state laws, individuals have come together to bring class action litigation, investor
groups have commenced litigation, and other associations, like the NAACP, have also brought suit.
See Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans: The Value of a Mass Torts Approach in Subprime
Mortgage Litigation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 35 (2009). Many of the class action cases have been
brought under the auspices of multidistrict litigation. Id. The state attorney general litigation
resulted in a $26 billion settlement. NOLETI'E, supra note 22, at 2.
59. Kathleen C. Engel, Local Governments and Risky Home Loans, 69 SMU L. REV. 609, 609
(2016).
60. The fact that these consequences were in many cases the results of racially discriminatory
acts is a further source of injury. The Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 n.10
(1974) indicated that emotional harm arising from housing discrimination was similar to
"defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress in tort law." Victor M. Goode & Conrad
A. Johnson, Emotional Harm in Housing Discrimination Cases: A New Look at a Lingering
Problem, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1143, 1153 (2002).
61. Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs, supra note 16, at 21.
62. Ngai Pindell, The FairHousingAct at Forty: PredatoryLending and the City as Plaintiff,
18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CoMMUNITY DEV. L. 169, 170 (2009).

1240

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:4:1227

police and fire services. 63 For example, Cleveland, in 2014, had 12,000
condemned or abandoned buildings that required demolition, at an
estimated cost of approximately $120 million. 64 It is estimated that each
abandoned property in a city generally costs "between $7,000 and
$30,000" to address.6 5
Nearly a dozen plaintiff cities have commenced litigation to
redress these harms. 66 While no municipality has yet achieved a final
court victory in this area, some have achieved handsome settlements 6 7
and many cases are still active and pending. 68 One case, Bank of
America Corp. v. City of Miami, reached the Supreme Court, where the
Court confirmed that the Fair Housing Act can provide a font of
standing for cities seeking to bring such claims.6 9 Less auspiciously,
though, the Court reaffirmed that a rigorous causation standard will
apply, and the city will have to show "some direct relation between the

&

63. Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs, supra note 16, at 21.
64. Engel, supra note 59, at 629.
65. Id.
66. They include Los Angeles, Miami Gardens, Memphis, Baltimore, Birmingham, Miami
City, Buffalo, New York City, Cincinnati, and Cleveland. See City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo
Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2014); City of Miami Gardens v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 1422203-CIV, 2014 WL 6455660 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2014); Memphis v. Wells Fargo N.A., No. 09-2857STA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48522 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2011); City of Birmingham v. Citigroup
Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-S., 2009 WL 8652915 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2009). Cobb County and
DeKalb County have also brought suit. See Cobb County v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:15-CV-04081LMM, 2016 WL 2937467 (N.D. Ga. May 2, 2016); DeKalb County. v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc.,
No. 1:12-CV-03640-SCJ, 2013 WL 7874104 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2013). Plaintiff city litigation for
the subprime mortgage crisis tends to adopt one of three potential framings: cities like Baltimore
have framed the claim as an FHA violation, cities like Cleveland have framed the claim as public
nuisance, and cities like Buffalo have argued that the banks violated local ordinances and created
a public nuisance by failing to maintain foreclosed properties. Brescia, supra note 58, at 38.
In addition to litigation, cities have also begun trying other techniques, including "responsible
banking ordinances, so-called 'Community Impact Report Cards' for financial institutions, and the
use of eminent domain to address underwater mortgages." Ray Brescia, Cities and the Financial
Crisis, in How CITIES WILL SAVE THE WORLD, supranote 1, at 11, 11.
67. Memphis received a "substantial financial settlement." Jonathan L. Entin, City
Governments and Predatory Lending Revisited, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE 108, 113
(2014), http://urbanlawjournal.com/files/2014/01/Entin-FINAL-1.22.141.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
JTE2-W6V7]. Baltimore's suit was dismissed, but it received approximately $175 million from a
lawsuit the federal government filed. Id. at 112-13 & n.35; Liz Farmer, Why Few Cities Will Take
the Supreme Court Up on Their Right to Sue Banks, GOVERNING (May 11, 2017),
http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-cities-banks-miami-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/MY94-WVZS]. Massachusetts and Nevada also received settlement funds, but
from state-led suits. Entin, supra, at 113. Los Angeles received $50 million in settlement funds
from Wells Fargo in September 2016. Debbie Hoffman & Alexandria Decatur, Part 1: The Fallout
of the Bank of America vs. City of Miami Decision, HOUSINGWIRE (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://www.housingwire.com/blogs/1-rewired/post/41394-part-1-the-fallout-of-the-bank-ofamerica-vs-city-of-miami-decision [https://perma.cclP439-KEUL].
68. Hoffman & Decatur, supra note 67.
69. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
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injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged" if it is to be
successful.70 To date, then, plaintiff city claims in this area have faced
significant hurdles,71 but litigative success remains possible. 72
5. The Opioid Epidemic
Most recently, there has been an uprising of plaintiff city
litigation in response to the opioid epidemic. 73 Since 2000, "[n]early
165,000 people have died from overdoses of prescription narcotics ,"?
and drug overdoses are now the "leading cause of death among
Americans under 50."75 An estimated "2.1 million people are addicted
to prescription painkillers." 76 Addiction to prescription painkillers is a
frequent precursor to other drug use: "75% of heroin users started using

70. Id. at 1306 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv'r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
71. Entin, supra note 67, at 114. Two weeks after the Supreme Court's ruling in Bank of
America Corp. v. City of Miami (though without citing to it), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held, in an unpublished opinion, that Los Angeles had "failed to show a
'robust' causal connection between any disparity and a facially-neutral Wells Fargo policy." City
of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., 691 F. App'x 453, 454 (9th Cir. 2017). A companion case, City
of Los Angeles v. Bank of America Corp., 691 F. App'x 464 (9th Cir. 2017), met a similar fate: the
Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, held that Los Angeles failed "to show a 'robust'
connection between this [racial] disparity and any BOA or Countrywide facially-neutral policy."
Id. at 465. Raymond Brescia also notes that subprime mortgage litigation faces an additional
problem: "[Miany of the subprime lenders ... were so aggressive in extending subprime loans [that
they] are now bankrupt." Brescia, supranote 66, at 56.
72. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 59, at 650 (proposing possible procedural reforms to better
enable municipalities to enjoin lenders). Also, two weeks after the Bank of America v. Miami
decision, Philadelphia filed a similar suit against Wells Fargo. Hoffman & Decatur, supra note 67.
73. The CDC has officially labeled the problem an "epidemic." Understandingthe Epidemic,
CTRS.

FOR DISEASE

CONTROL

&

PREVENTION,

https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/

index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cclYY56-S798]. In addition to these plaintiff
city claims, cities have also created a coalition similar to that created in response to the failure of
gun litigation. Eliza Gray, Cities Ask the Federal Government to Fight Painkiller Deaths, TIME
MAG. (Sept. 16, 2014), http://time.com/3387136/painkiller-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/PM3D-752J].
The Big Cities Health Coalition has banded together to lobby the federal government to help
address the problem. Id. The Public Health Commissioner of Boston, Barbara Ferrer, noted the
importance of this lobbying effort: "We don't come forward a lot.. . . When big cities say there is
need for [a] federal policy agenda, people should stand up and listen." Id. (second alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Lenny Bernstein, Pfizer Reaches Agreement with Chicago to Limit Opioid Marketing, CHI.
TRIB. (July 6, 2016, 7:41 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-pfizer-opioid-marketing20160705-story.html [https://perma.cclRT9H-9RC4]; see also John Schwartz, Chicago and 2
California Counties Sue Over Marketing of Painkillers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/us/chicago-and-2-california-counties-sue-drug-companiesover-painkiller-marketing.html [https://perma.cc/PWZ4-RWP9].
75. Josh Katz, Drug Deaths in America Are Rising Faster Than Ever, N.Y. TIMES (June 5,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid-epidemic-drug-overdoses
2017),
.html [https://perma.cc/2M5A-JQR2].
76. Bernstein, supranote 74.
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heroin after getting into opioid painkillers first."7 7 The scale at which

towns and cities have been flooded with opioids is staggering: for
example, "drug wholesalers shipped 9 million opioid pills to a pharmacy
in Kermit, WV, a town of just 400 people."7 8
In addition to the profound human costs, opioid addiction poses
significant costs to cities. For instance, as Chicago alleged in their
claim, opioid abuse caused "about 1,100 emergency room visits" in 2009
and resulted in "$12.3 million in insurance claims for painkiller
prescriptions" between 2008 and 2015.79 Over one hundred additional

cities and counties have now brought suit to recover these and other
costs of providing opioid-related services, with more continually joining
their ranks.8 0 Dayton, Ohio, for example, commenced a suit, noting that
their "law enforcement, fire and EMS personnel have already
responded to more than 1,800 calls related to suspected overdoses since
the start of 2017," a "remarkable number in a city with around 140,000

77. Eliza Gray, Chicago Blames Big Pharmafor Epidemic Addictions to Painkillers, TIME
MAG.
(June 4,
2014),
http://time.com/2822381/chicago-blaims-big-pharma-for-epidemicaddictions-to-painkillers/ [https://perma.cc/J45W-52H7].
78. 9 Million Painkillers Shipped to Tiny West Virginia Town, MSNBC (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://www.msnbc.com/all-in/watch/9-million-painkillers-shipped-to-tiny-west-virginia-town895420995808 [https://perma.cc/2WT8-3M9R].
79. Bernstein, supra note 74.
80. Schwartz, supra note 74. Other plaintiffs include Everett, Washington; Stockton,
California (along with its fire department and the county); Orange and Santa Clara counties in
California; and Huntington, West Virginia. See Jerry Mitchell, Mississippi Sets Tone as Opioid
Drugmakers Face Rising Tide of Lawsuits, CLARION LEDGER (June 10, 2017, 4:58 PM),
http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2017/06/11/mississippi-sets-tone-opioid-drugmakersface-rising-tide-lawsuits/346518001 [https://perma.cc/QSN3-85TF]; Roger Phillips, Stockton SJ,
Fire District Sue Drug Companies over Opioid Crisis, RECORDNET.COM (June 23, 2017, 6:28 PM),
http://www.recordnet.cominews/20170623/stockton-si-fire-district-sue-drug-companies-overopioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/3L5A-FANW]. Tacoma, Washington, is contemplating a suit as well.
Editorial Board, Tacoma Has Big Work to Do Before Suing Big Pharma, NEWS TRIB. (June 10,
2017, 5:00 PM), http://www.thenewstribune.com/opinion/articlel55389204.html [https://perma.cc/
ZSW7-ZQYV]. The Cherokee nation has also sued. Alana Semuels, Are PharmaceuticalCompanies
to Blame for the Opioid Epidemic?, ATLANTIC (June 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2017/06/lawsuit-pharmaceutical-companies-opioids/529020/
[https://perma.cc/
9PGD-FKV9]. Much of the opioid plaintiff city litigation is now managed by U.S. District Judge
Dan Polster, who is "overseeing more than two hundred cases filed by local governments" against
opioid manufacturers and distributors. Jef Feeley, Opioid Judge Wants 'Meaningful'National
Accord on Cities' Suits, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2018, 1:52 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/20 18-01-09/opioid-judge-wants-meaningful-national-accord-on-cities-suits
[https://perma.cc/4S3P-CLXT]. Judge Polster is hearing the multitude of cases as a result of an
order by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Eric Heisig, Cleveland Federal Judge to
Hear Dozens of Lawsuits Filed Against Big PharmaNationwide, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 5, 2017),
http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssfl2017/12/cleveland federaljudge-to-hea1.html
[https://perma.cc/5L5K-A8UQ]. The order noted Judge Polster's previous experience handling
lawsuits involving injuries sustained by people exposed to a chemical element called gadolinium
during MRls." Id. Judge Polster is encouraging settlement. Feeley, supra.
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residents." 81 In Delray Beach, Florida, (a state where "[b]etween 72 and
82 opioid prescriptions are written for every 100 people" 82) the mayor
noted that litigation was one thing that the city could do to address the
problem: "With virtually no help from our federal government and little
from our state .

.

. cities like ours are now frantically searching for

answers for our own population." 83 Delray Beach, like many other cities
struggling to cope with the challenges of an addicted population, hopes
litigation might be one of those answers.
B. Featuresof PlaintiffCity Claims
By situating themselves as plaintiffs in these cases, plaintiff
cities are emphasizing the public nature of the underlying harms.
Plaintiff cities hope that the current litigation will benefit from an
important lesson learned from the tobacco suits: when governmental
entities become plaintiffs, potential defensive arguments based on
individual litigants can be neutralized. The tobacco litigation
experience taught that when individual litigants brought claims,
"juries often blame[d] the smoker and [were] unwilling in most cases to
reward smokers for their [perceived] self-imposed harm." 84 When the
plaintiff was a government entity, "[i]t [was] much more difficult to
blame the state for the lung cancer of many of its citizens."86 In other
words, changing the plaintiff changed how the harm was understood.
Rather than being understood as the result of individual choices for
which individuals should bear the cost, plaintiff city claims are
reframed as harms to the public, which are the result of third-party
wrongdoing, and for which, accordingly, those third-party wrongdoers
should bear the cost.86

81. Matthew Rozsa, An Ohio City Is Suing Pharmaceutical Companies over the Opioid
Epidemic, SALON (June 7, 2017, 10:52 AM), https://www.salon.com/2017/06/07/an-ohio-city-issuing-pharmaceutical-companies-over-the-opioid-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/SU4N-A8FY].
82. Lulu Ramadan, Breaking: Delray Will Sue Big Pharmafor 'Scourge of Opioid Addiction,'
PALM BEACH POST (July 19, 2017, 8:58 AM), http://www.palmbeachpost.comInews/local/breakingdelray-will-sue-big-pharma-for-scourge-opioid-addiction/2ksAOmBceTdRfprEL2JR1J/
[https://perma.cclD7BW-YVYU].
83. Id. (alteration in original).
84. Erichson, supra note 29, at 142.
85. Id. Many individual litigants suing gun manufacturers faced a similar obstacle: courts
and juries found that the blame for gun violence fell on individual shooters, rather than on the gun
industry. Id. at 142-43. One much-publicized 1995 case, though, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, appeared
to buck this trend, garnering a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff approximately $4 million. 62 F.
Supp. 2d 802, 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). This case, though, was overturned on appeal. Hamilton v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21, 26 (2d Cir. 2001).
86. Butterfield, supra note 25.
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In fact, as this Section will outline, plaintiff city litigation tends
to center around a specific type of public harm: those that impact public
health. More specifically, plaintiff city claims usually focus on public
health harms that have either deliberately targeted or have most
injured vulnerable populations. Finally, the public health wrongs
underlying plaintiff city litigation often inflict their injuries through a
process of "slow violence," a gradual accretion and development of
injury that is temporally distanced from its cause.8 7
1. Public Health
Lead and opioids are easily recognized as stereotypical public
health harms.8 8 But, less obviously, gun violence, environmental
harms, and the subprime mortgage crisis are all matters of public
health as well. In the 1990s, when plaintiff cities first brought the gun
litigation, the idea that gun violence could be a public health problem,
and not merely a problem of individual criminal wrongdoing, was new.8 9
The seeds of the idea began in the 1960s and 1970s, with the release of
the 1964 Report to the Surgeon General regarding tobacco 90 and the
publication of Ralph Nader's groundbreaking book Unsafe at Any
Speed.91 Both writings helped to shape the idea of "public wrongs," 92
and contributed to important theoretical and methodological shifts that
were occurring in the field of public health. 93 Most notably, injury
87. See infra Section I.B.3.
88. There is, though, a politics behind what gets categorized as a public health harm. The
white population benefits from a much more humane "public health" response to the social problem
of opioids than African Americans did when the crack epidemic tore through those communities
and received a "criminal law" response. See Andrew Cohen, How White Users Made Heroin a Public
Health Problem, ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politicsarchive/2015/08/
crack-heroin-and-race/401015/ [https://perma.cc/D2L6-CD55].
89. Public health is commonly defined as "what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the
conditions in which people can be healthy." Wendy E. Parmet, Tobacco, HIV, and the Courtroom:
The Role of Affirmative Litigation in the Formationof PublicHealth Policy, 36 Hous. L. REV. 1663,
1665 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barry S. Levy, Twenty-First Century
Challenges for Law and Public Health, 32 IND. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (1999)) (noting this common
definition from the Institute of Medicine).
90. Id. at 1700.
91. See id. at 1675 n.65 (explaining Samuel Jan Brakel, Using What We Know About Our
Civil Litigation System: A Critique of "Base-Rate"Analysisand Other Apologist Diversions, 31 GA.
L. REV. 77, 157 (1996), as "finding that in the 1960s, consumer advocates such as Ralph Nader
helped shift public attitude").
92. See id. (parenthetically discussing "consumer advocates such as Ralph Nader" and citing
Samuel Jan Brakel, Using What We Know About Our Civil Litigation System: A Critiqueof 'BaseRate"Artalysis and Other Apologist Diversions, 31 GA. L. REV. 77, 157 (1996)).
93. Another corresponding legal evolution was that "as part of the development of
environmental law in the 1970s and 1980s, courts began to allow for mass product torts that were
not limited solely to individuals suffering a discrete injury, but that were conceived as collective
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prevention was emerging as an important heuristic and subfield. 94
Public health researchers began to examine "violence as a source of
injury," which led to the consideration of the connections between gun
violence and widespread injury.95 Then, using the methodological tools
of public health, and its particular focus on populations, rather than
individuals, public health scholars performed the then-novel act of
thinking about gun deaths in the aggregate.9 6 As basic as that idea
sounds to contemporary ears, this different view of injury revealed the
theretofore unknown fact that after motor vehicle deaths, guns were the
next leading cause of injury-related death in the United States. 97
With epidemiological tools, public health scholars were then able
to "identify the causes and distribution of gun violence injury" that
differed from the usual narrative that gun violence was simply a result
of individual choice.98 They discovered that the way firearms were
designed (i.e., without easily implemented safety mechanisms) and
marketed (i.e., with manufacturers and dealers overlooking obvious
regulatory breaches and highlighting factors that would only be of
interest to people intending to use guns for interpersonal violence) was
a significant factor in the high rate of gun violence. 99 These insights
formed the basis of the litigation.
The subprime mortgage crisis also has a significant public
health dimension. The physical abandoned homes themselves give rise
to several public health harms. As the Miami police detailed in their
amicus brief in Miami v. Bank of America, the homes became breeding
grounds for a whole host of disturbing criminal activities, dangers, and
diseases. The houses were used to "hide dead bodies and to advertise
child sex trafficking,"10 0 and "[iun one heartbreaking case, a toddler
drowned in the swimming pool of his neighbor's vacant house."10 1 Some
public health officials suggest that "untended pools in foreclosed homes

harms that could be governed by other areas of the law (namely public nuisance)." Sarah Staszak,
PrivatePower and Public Policy: Rights Enforcement in the Modern Litigation State, 47 TULSA L.
REV. 77, 83 (2011) (book review).
94. Lytton, supra note 30, at 4; see also Richard J. Bonnie & Bernard Guyer, Injury as a Field
of Public Health:Achievements and Controversies, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 267, 271 (2002).
95. Lytton, supra note 30, at 4.
96. Mair et al., supranote 27, at 40.
97. Id.
98. Lytton, supranote 30, at 4.
99. Id. at 7-9.
100. Farmer, supra note 67.
101. Id.
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became breeding grounds for swarms of mosquitos and 'created the
epicenter for America's first Zika outbreak.' "102
Further, as detailed in a Harvard School of Public Health
Special Report, The Financial Crisis as a Public Health Crisis, the
financial crisis is not only related to the usual stress and stress-related
diseases to be expected following the loss of or foreclosure on one's
home. 10 3 There are also surprising spillover effects, including an
associated increase of 0.2 body mass index units for those living "within
100 meters of a foreclosed home." 104 Other harms not immediately
identifiable as involving public health shed additional light on this
relationship. For instance, the American Psychiatric Association's
president has argued that the BP oil spill's impact on mental health
should be compensable.105 He notes that "[m]ental illnesses brought on
by difficult situations surrounding the BP oil spill may be less visible
than other injuries, but they are real. An entire way of life has been
destroyed, and this is causing anxiety, depression, post-traumatic
stress disorder, substance use disorders, thoughts of suicide and other
problems" in much of the population affected. 106
2. Vulnerability
Looking at plaintiff city claims through a public health/public
harms lens reveals that many of the litigated harms are felt most deeply
by vulnerable populations, including racial minorities and the disabled.
Many of the impugned harms have significant racial dimensions. Gun
violence, for instance, is a public harm "disproportionately affecting the
country's African American population."10 7 In fact, "[b]lack Americans
are more than twice as likely to die from gun violence than whites."10
102. Id.
103. Amy Gutman, Failing Economy, Failing Health, HARV. PUB. HEALTH MAG. (2017),
https://www.hsph.harvard.edulmagazine/magazine article/failing-economy-failing-health/
[https://perma.cc/75CK-ZS36] (explaining how untended swimming pools on foreclosed properties
fostered growths of West Nile strains).
104. Id.
105. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Parens Patriae Litigation to Redress Societal
Damages from the BP Oil Spill: The Latest Stage in the Evolution of Crimtorts, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 45, 58-59 (2011).
106. Id. at 59 n.55 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Press Release, Am. Psychiatric
Ass'n, American Psychiatric Association Calls for Payment of Oil Spill Mental Health Claims (Aug.
13, 2010)).
107. Roberto A. Ferdman, The Racial Divide in America's Gun Deaths, WASH. POST (Sept. 19,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/19/the-racial-divide-in-americasgun-deaths/?utmterm=.4e4b25482al4 [https://perma.cclM79L-SJT8].
108. Id. (noting that "[b]etween 2000 and 2010, the death rate due to firearm-related injuries
was more than 18.5 per 100,000 among blacks, but only nine per 100,000 among whites").
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This, stunningly, is actually an improvement on the situation almost
thirty years ago, in the early 1990s, when "African Americans were
more than three times as likely to die from gun violence than white
Americans." 10 9 The Hispanic community, too, suffers disproportionately
from gun violence: they are the victims of homicide almost twice as often
1 10
as whites, and two-thirds of those homicides involve firearms.
The subprime mortgage crisis shares a similar racialized
pattern. It also had its greatest impact on minority populations, and
specifically on African American homeowners. Up until the 1990s,
banks discriminated against minority would-be homeowners mainly
through redlining, meaning they would not issue loans in majorityminority neighborhoods.1 1 1 As part of this redlining practice, banks
"collected reliable data on the most economically vulnerable
households." 1 12 Years later, banks used that same data "to flood
minority neighborhoods with high-cost subprime loan offers." 113 As a
result, in the ten-year period from 1996 to 2006, "the national subprime
loan market grew from $97 billion to $640 billion." 114 Through subprime
lending, banks lent to "black and Hispanic borrowers" at rates that were
on national average "three times and two-and-a-half times more than
housing market
whites, respectively." 115 Then, "when the . ..
1 17
and "were
collapsed,"1 16 minority homeowners were "hit hardest,"
1 18
Finally,
homes."
their
lose
to
much more likely than Caucasians
"adding insult to injury, after the economic meltdown the same lenders
disproportionately refused minority borrowers' requests to refinance
the original loans so they could stay in their homes," which "meant that
majority-minority neighborhoods saw more foreclosures than majorityCaucasian neighborhoods."1 19 In Los Angeles, for example, a loan made
to a homeowner "in a majority-minority neighborhood [was] more than
twice as likely to result in foreclosure as a loan in a majority Caucasian
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Josh Sugarmann, Gun Violence Kills More Than 3,000 HispanicsPer Year, New Study
Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 6, 2015, 10:54 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joshsugarmann/gun-violence-kills-more-t-b_7948560.html [https://perma.cc/5TWJ-VNY4].
111. Morris, supra note 1, at 196.
112. Id. at 195.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. David D. Troutt, DisappearingNeighbors, 123 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 21, 24 (2010).
116. Morris, supra note 1, at 195.
117. Engel, supranote 59, at 630.
118. Morris, supra note 1, at 195; see also Engel, supra note 59, at 630 ("Communities of color
have been hit hardest by foreclosures because many predatory and subprime lenders targeted
people of color with the worst loans.").
119. Morris, supra note 1, at 195.
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neighborhood." 1 2 0 Further, "since home equity represents a
disproportionately high percentage of overall wealth, these actions will
impact generations." 12 1
Vulnerability is a theme in the opioid litigation as well, though
opioids targeted a different vulnerable population: people in pain.122
Patients experiencing pain and difficulty functioning are the most
common victims of opioid addictions, and a new "growing body of
studies" suggests that patients with mental illnesses receive
approximately half of all opioid prescriptions, creating a situation
where "[t]he very folks who are most vulnerable to opioids' deadliest
effects are unusually likely to get a long-term supply of the drugs." 123
Their access to opioids was fueled by pharmaceutical companies
"aggressively marketing the drug to providers and patients as ... safe
alternative[s] to short-acting narcotics." 124
Lead paint poisoning also has noticeable race and class
dimensions. 125 Most notably, lead poisoning is "a disease that primarily
impacts African-Americans." 126 There is "a correlation between cities
with high percentages of African-American residents and elevated lead

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Ironically, racism actually ended up protecting minority populations from opioid
addiction. Put bluntly, "[b]lacks have been undertreated for pain for decades," since "physicians'
prejudice leads many to prescribe opioids at a lower rate to black and Latino patients than to
whites." Steven Ross Johnson, The Racial Divide in the Opioid Crisis,MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 24,
2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160224/NEWS/160229947
[https://perma.cc/
DYN6-W8LY]; see also Sophie Gilbert, Warning: This Drug May Kill You Offers a Close-Up of the
Opioid Epidemic, ATLANTIC (May 1, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/
2017/05/warning-this-drug-may-kill-you-opioid-epidemic-hbo524982/
[https://perma.cclHH54SY29]. However, that gap is now waning. See Josh Katz & Abby Goodnough, The Opioid CrisisIs
Getting Worse, Particularly for Black Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/22/upshot/opioid-deaths-are-spreading-rapidlyinto-black-america.html [https://perma.cclK5DL-YX7Y].
123. Francie Diep, We're Giving the Most Vulnerable People the Most Potent Opioid Painkiller
Prescriptions, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 31, 2017), https://psmag.com/news/were-giving-the-mostvulnerable-people-the-most-potent-opioid-painkiller-prescriptions [https://perma.cc/7MIRJ-Z37G].
124. Celine Gounder, Who is Responsible for the Pain-PillEpidemic?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 8,
2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/who-is-responsible-for-the-pain-pillepidemic [https://perma.ce/5F72-Q8MY]. In fact, cities are themselves somewhat vulnerable
entities, with relatively little regulatory power. 'This vulnerability is a function of the city's-all
cities'-liminal status in American law." Richard C. Schragger, When White SupremacistsInvade
a City, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 58, 60 (2018).
125. In some ways this is not surprising, since "[c]urrent tort law contains incentives to target
individuals and communities based on race and gender." Ronen Avraham & Kim Yuracko, Torts
and Discrimination, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 661, 661 (2017).
126. Schumaker & Scheller, supra note 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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poisoning rates," 127 and one study found that in the five-year period
from 1999 to 2004, "[b]lack children were nearly three times more likely
than white children to have highly elevated blood-lead levels, the type
of lead poisoning where the most damaging health outcomes occur."1 28
In Detroit, for example, "where the population is 84 percent black," over
1,500 children were found to have lead poisoning in 2014.129 In
Baltimore, Freddie Gray, whose death in the back of a police van led to
the criminal prosecutions of six officers, was a "lead kid," "one of
thousands of children in the city with toxic levels of lead in their blood
from years of living in substandard housing." 3 0 Currently, in wealthy
neighborhoods, lead hazards have been "largely eliminated," but in
poorer ones, it remains a widespread problem with devastating
consequences. 131
3. Slow Violence
Lead paint is but one example of the broader connections
between environmental harms, vulnerable populations, and public
health. Another is climate change, which affects air quality. In the U.S.,
air pollution is responsible for "200,000 early deaths each year. Men,
poor people and African-Americans are disproportionately at risk.
According to a comprehensive Harvard University study last year of air
pollution in the U.S., black people are about three times more likely to
die from exposure to airborne pollutants than others."1 32
Harms like lead poisoning and air pollution, and indeed like
most of the plaintiff city claims, share another characteristic. Just as
127. Id. "According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, children of color whose
families are poor and who live in housing built before 1950 have the highest lead poisoning risk."
Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. Unfortunately, the now-bankrupt Detroit only had "enough money for 100 to 200 lead
paint abatements each year." Id.
130. Id.
131. For example, "[alarming levels of brain-damaging lead are poisoning more than a fifth of
the children tested from some of the poorest parts of Chicago, even as the hazard has been largely
eliminated in more prosperous neighborhoods." Michael Hawthorne, Lead Paint Poisons Poor
Chicago Kids as City Spends Millions Less on Clean Up, CHI. TRIB. (May 1, 2015),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-lead-poisoning-chicago-met-20150501-story.html
[https://perma.cc/9GG9-NZRK]. Chicago brought an unsuccessful lead case in 2003. Twelve years
later, Chicago is still struggling to absorb the cost of addressing that harm and has now slashed
its lead-abatement budget, essentially "leaving certain neighborhoods to fend for themselves." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Julia Craven, Even Breathing Is a Risk in One of Orlando's Poorest Neighborhoods,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2018, 5:46 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.comlentry/florida-poor27
[https://perma.cclR8KNblack-neighborhood-air-pollution us5a663a67e4b0e563007 46e
LDK3].
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the harms are most visible at the collective level of a population, rather
than on the individual level, so too do they share a temporal scale: the
harms are aggregative, accretive, and longitudinal, taking a long time
to manifest or become visible. This makes them difficult to represent, 133
both literally and figuratively. Rather than the discrete, relatively
quick harms that the law is most adept at addressing, these harms are
forms of "slow violence," "a violence that occurs gradually and out of
sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and
space." 134 Indeed, this "attritional violence" is not usually understood
"as violence at all." 135 Violence or injury is most commonly "conceived
as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and
spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational
visibility." Slow violence, on the other hand, "is neither spectacular nor
instantaneous." 1 3 6 It is "incremental and accretive, its calamitous
repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales." 137
This "temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we
perceive and respond" to it, 138 and makes it difficult for the law to fully
address these harms. One challenge of harms arising from slow violence
is that
in the long arc between the emergence of slow violence and its delayed effects, both the
causes and the memory of catastrophe readily fade from view as the casualties incurred
typically pass untallied and unremembered. Such discounting in turn makes it far more
1 39
difficult to secure effective legal measure for prevention, restitution, and redress.

Vulnerable populations are most often the "long-term casualties of ...
'slow violence.' "140 Through it, these populations are "discounted as

133. NIXON, supra note 18, at 2-6 (discussing the "representational challenges" of slow
violence).
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id. The harbinger of plaintiff city litigation, asbestos, is a quintessential example of slow
violence, as the diseases caused by asbestos exposure "often appear only many years after initial
exposure." Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Triumph and Failureof
the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 257-58 (2005). Nixon's theory of slow violence is
rooted in environmental harms. For a detailed examination of a particular interaction between
slow violence, environmental injustice, and race, see Craven, supra note 132 (discussing how the
extreme air pollution in an Orlando neighborhood is "the sum of a series of choices made over the
course of a century, the effect of which was to transmute formal segregation into the very air
certain people breathe," and noting that "in the U.S., black people are about three times more
likely to die from exposure to airborne pollutants than others").
136. NIXON, supra note 18, at 2.
137. Id. at 2.
138. Id. at 3.
139. Id. at 8-9.
140. Id. at 2.
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political agents" and are the bearers of injuries that tend to go
"unobserved .. . untreated," and unaddressed. 141
II. LEGITIMACY

Because they are the level of government closest to the people
and "interact with their residents each day," cities and municipal
governments have "an excellent vantage point for recognizing patterns
of harm affecting their communities." 14 2 Through their ordinary, dayto-day operations like "running a hospital or identifying blighted
properties-cities become potent information aggregators." 143 Also,
because "a city's welfare is intimately intertwined with that of its
residents," cities are motivated to "take remedial action, including
suing to protect [their] residents from things like fraud, public
nuisance, and infringement of their rights." 144 In other words, they can
see the problem, and they suffer injury from the problem. It therefore
seems logical that they would also be a good choice for attempting to
remedy the problem. But even though cities are in a good structural
position to be litigants, the legitimacy of them bringing these kinds of
mass-tort, public interest suits is hotly contested. Thus far, a city's
potential power to bring claims has been quite circumscribed: "[A] city's
power to sue for those collective harms is minimal and often
subordinate to state enforcement by attorneys general."1 45
In fact, "the current political environment is quite hostile to
cities." 146 Cities have no "ally in the Oval Office, or in any of the
branches of the federal government, and they have few allies in the
states."1 4 7 Not surprisingly, then, when cities do try to bring these
claims, critics argue that they "exceed[] the City's legal or political
authority."14 8 In terms of doctrine, critics argue that plaintiff cities
cannot meet standing requirements; that they fail to establish
causation; that, if public nuisance is relied on, it is an inappropriate
cause of action; and that a variety of municipal-specific rules prevent

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 2, 6.
Caruso, supra note 7, at 61.
Id.
Id.
Troutt, supra note 115, at 27.
Schragger, supranote 9, at 131.
Id.
Kathleen S. Morris, San Franciscoand the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local Public

Law Offices, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST

ADVOCACY 51, 57 (Liman Pub. Interest Program at Yale Law Sch. 2008), https://law.yale.edul
system/files/documents/pdf/liman-whyTheLocalMatters.pdf [https://perma.ccGST7-DENI].
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cost recovery.149 In political terms, they argue that plaintiff city claims
violate the relationship between cities and states, impermissibly use
litigation as regulation, and are generally undemocratic.
This Part argues against those critiques. It explicates the many
reasons why plaintiff cities are in fact legitimate: legally, politically,
and sociologically. Although "legitimacy" means many different things
to different people, Richard Fallon has offered a useful framework for
unpacking arguments related to legitimacy, identifying the three
submeanings that the term is most often meant to encompass: (1) legal
legitimacy, (2) moral or political legitimacy, and (3) sociological
legitimacy. 150 These three are "interrelated and not always
distinguishable from one another," but they "[n]evertheless . . . provide
valuable ways of thinking about this contested term." 15 1 And, as
Alexandra Lahav demonstrated in the class action context, they can be
a useful architecture for analyzing controversial legal mechanisms. 152

A. Legality
Legal legitimacy refers to whether the impugned mechanism
can meet the spirit or letter of the usual doctrinal standards. It is
"measured by compliance with legal norms." 15 3 Normally, a claim that
complies with civil procedural rules will be deemed legally legitimate
(though not necessarily morally or sociologically legitimate). 154
Standing presents the biggest doctrinal hurdle of legal legitimacy for

plaintiff cities. 155
1. Standing
The threshold doctrinal hurdle regarding the legal legitimacy of
plaintiff city claims concerns the city's standing. In general, "[m] any
U.S. cities have explicit authorization to sue under their city

149. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 15.
150. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1787, 1790
(2005).
151. Alexandra Lahav, The PoliticalJitstification for Group Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
3193, 3195 (2013).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Some defendants have argued that certain cost recovery rules that prevent municipalities
from recovering for the costs of governmental services should be a bar to plaintiff city suits. Most
of these arguments have been rejected on the grounds that the rule is limited to premises-liabilitytype situations. See Ausness, supra note 15, at 892-95; Caruso, supra note 7, at 81.
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charters."1 56 These cities can thus bring claims in both federal and state
courts qua cities, 15 7 as, for instance, they often do when making claims
based on their proprietary interests. 158
The situation becomes more complicated when cities bring masstort style, public interest litigation. 1 59 States typically carry their
version of this litigation into federal court through the door of parens
patriae. Cities, however, cannot use this same entry point. Courts have
almost uniformly held that cities have no parens patriae power to bring
claims related to the general health and welfare of their citizens.1 6 0 The
reason for this denial of parens patriae status is that parens patriae is
rooted in the state's quasi-sovereign interest "in the well-being of its
residents," 161 and the city, lacking sovereignty, has no such privilege. 1 62
To many observers and scholars, it seems like cities should of
course have parens patriae powers. Thus, off-the-cuff comments in
scholarship often refer to the parens patriae powers of cities. 1 6 3 More
explicitly, many scholars offer compelling arguments that cities "plainly
have [such] a 'quasi-sovereign' interest in protecting the well-being of
their residents" 164 and therefore should also be granted parens patriae
standing. Until these academic arguments are more widely accepted or
adopted, however, the current legal consensus denying municipalities
parens patriae powers means that legal legitimacy is not readily
available through this route.
Even without parens patriae, though, plaintiff cities can
establish standing and demonstrate legal legitimacy in other ways. As
the Supreme Court affirmed in Bank of America v. Miami, statutes like
the Fair Housing Act can provide cities with paths to standing.165 In
addition to statutory standing, other available avenues include direct

156. Gavioli, supra note 16, at 945. Laura Gavioli notes that the "typical language states that
a city 'may sue and defend in all matters and proceedings."' Id.
157. Engel, supranote 59, at 618.
158. Id.
159. Kathleen Morris calls these "Constituent Cases." Morris, supra note 148, at 52.
160. Caruso, supra note 7, at 65.
161. Id.
162. Ausness, supra note 15, at 861-62. The parens patriae doctrine does not let states "step
into the shoes of [their] residents," but instead allows states to bring actions if they can identify a
"broader interest" or "widely shared" harm. Caruso, supra note 7, at 66 & n.30.
163. See, e.g., Wiley, supra note 25, at 212 ("If a state or city government bringing suit in
pareaspatriae .... ); see also Rustad & Koenig, supra note 105, at 78 ("Federal courts have been
more receptive to the long-established remedy of parens patriae environmental tort actions filed
by states and municipalities than to comparable class actions.").
164. Barron, supranote 10, at 2243; see also Gavioli, supra note 16, at 959 ("Arguably, a city
as a governmental entity has an interest in the health and welfare of its citizens .....
165. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1303 (2017).
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standing rules, associational standing doctrine, and common law public
nuisance standing. Each of these emphasizes a different facet of cities.
Direct standing focuses on cities as landowners; associational standing
focuses on cities as public corporations; 16 6 and public nuisance standing
focuses on cities as public or governmental entities. In addition to these
differing emphases, these three ways of establishing standing also
reflect different understandings of the kind of representational
litigation cities are engaged in when they bring plaintiff city claims. 167
Though they vary in emphases and framing, these three forms of
standing-direct standing, associational standing, and public nuisance
standing-are all paths to legal legitimacy.

166. Unfortunately, a city's corporate rights are currently not as robust as a private
corporation's. As Richard Schragger explains:
The relative thinness of a municipality's corporate rights is a function of the rise of the
public/private distinction in the nineteenth century. Almost a generation ago, legal
scholars Gerald Frug and Hendrik Hartog described how the municipal corporation lost
its corporate privileges and became an arm of the state, while the private business
corporation attained property and constitutional rights.
Schragger, supra note 124, at 67.
167. Margaret Lemos has argued that state parens patriae actions are similar to class actions,
and thus should attract similar procedural protections. Margaret Lemos, Aggregate Litigation
Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARv. L. REV. 486, 499-511
(2012). However, Lemos's view "that public compensation is a government form of class action
litigation" is not universally accepted. See Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and
PrivateRights, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2313, 2316 (2016). Howard Erichson, for example, argues that
"the nature of the litigative representation differs significantly in the two types of cases." Erichson,
supra note 29, at 142. Similarly, Prentiss Cox argues that Lemos relies on a "mistaken premise,"
and that "[t]he decision by a government enforcer to pursue public compensation does not diminish
the public nature of the enforcement action and does not convert public officials into
representatives of private interests." Cox, supra, at 2316. In the context of state opioid litigation,
at least one court has agreed with Erichson and Cox. In the context of a state and county public
action where Kentucky and Pike County sued pharmaceutical manufacturer Purdue for its role in
the opioid crisis, there was much wrangling over whether the case properly belonged jn state or
federal court, with the case bouncing between the two. Purdue wanted the case heard in federal
court and argued that it belonged there because it was essentially a class action and subject to the
Class Action Fairness Act. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 210 (2d Cir. 2013). It
argued that the Attorney General was "assert[ing] representative claims for restitution on behalf
of individual OxyContin users." Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against
PrescriptionDrug Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1155 (2013). The court, however, found that
"parenspatriaeactions, such as the one in question, had few, if any, class-like characteristics." Id.
at 1155. "Accordingly, the court concluded that '[i]n form as well as in function,' parens patriae
suits" differed from class actions. Id. at 1155.
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a. Direct Standing
Because cities own property,1 68 they can sue when another party
"diminish[es] the value of that property." 16 9 These "city cases" are
generally the least controversial basis for city litigation, 170 as they rely
on a city's "private" rights as a landowner.171
Property rights are a capacious category here. Cities and
residents have deeply entangled interests, and their close relationship
means that a harm to residents almost inevitably affects the city, often
in its proprietary capacity. Cities therefore have successfully argued
that a harm to their property interests gives them standing, even when
that harm also affects a city's residents. For instance, in City of Olmsted
Falls v. FederalAviation Administration, a federal appellate court held
that the city had standing to bring an action challenging a Federal
Aviation Administration decision about an airport runway project.1 72
The court found that the city's argument that its citizens would be
impacted by the environmental pollutants entering the air and water
supply did not give the city standing, but that standing could be based
on the city's allegation of "harm to its own economic interests based on
the environmental impacts of the approved project." 173
Ever since the Supreme Court found in Massachusetts v. EPA
that Massachusetts had standing to bring a claim against the
Environmental Protection Agency because of its status as a landowner
"with property allegedly affected by rising sea tides due to climate
change,"' 7 4 cities have been putting forth arguments that, as property
owners, too, they have similar standing rights. 7 5 Indeed, New York
City and Baltimore were actually plaintiffs in Massachusetts, "but their
standing was not passed upon." 7 6 As these property-based

168. Such property often includes "commercial real estate where municipal offices can be
found, properties seized for delinquent taxes, or park land." Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs, supra
note 16, at 45.
169. Id.
170. Morris, supra note 1, at 221.
171. Ausness, supranote 15, at 883.
172. 292 F.3d 261, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
173. Id.
174. Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs, supra note 16, at 28 (explaining the holding of
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007)).
175. See, e.g., id. at 32 (describing a suit brought by New York City and eight states against
six power companies).
176. Caruso, supra note 7, at 66 n.34.
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environmental cases become more common, they may make it easier for
other types of plaintiff city claims to come under this rubric as well.177
b. Associational Standing
As Kaitlyn Ainsworth Caruso has persuasively argued,
associational standing provides an additional doctrinal basis for
plaintiff city standing. 178 Associational standing emphasizes the city's
corporate nature, and would allow cities to pursue associational
standing in the same way that any other corporation or not-for-profit
can have associational standing.1 7 9 Associational standing allows
"associations to assert their members' rights" 180 and "sue on its
members' behalf" 18 1 when: "(a) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect
are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit." 18 2
Courts have differing opinions regarding whether cities can
meet this test.183 In Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Snapp v.
Puerto Rico, 184 four members of the Supreme Court suggested that they
can. In deciding whether Puerto Rico had parens patriae powers to
bring a suit based on discrimination against its citizens, Justice
Brennan noted, "At the very least, the prerogative of a State to bring
suits in federal court should be commensurate with the ability of private
organizations." 185 He then cited a number of cases in support of this

177. As outlined in Part I, plaintiff city environmental claims have included suits against
companies for polluting waterways with polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") and for harms
connected to MTBE. San Jose, Berkeley, Oakland, San Francisco Bay, San Diego, Spokane,
Seattle, Portland, and Long Beach have sued Monsanto, Solutia, and Pharmacic for depositing
their PCBs. See Barrena, supra note 54. For a discussion of the MTBE litigation, see Thornburg,
supra note 57.
178. Caruso, supra note 7.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 71.
181. Id. at 72.
182. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Associations can
also have organizational standing, on behalf of themselves, if "(1) some or all of the association's
members have suffered individual injury, or (2) the association, likened to a single person, has
suffered an injury comparable to one to which an individual could be vulnerable." Heidi Li
Feldman, Note, Divided We Fall:Associational Standing and Collective Interest, 87 MICH. L. REV.
733, 733 (1988).
183. Caruso, supra note 7, at 74-75.
184. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
185. Id. at 611.
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proposition, some where the plaintiffs were private organizations, and
some where the plaintiffs were municipalities.186 Justice Brennan
explicitly likened Puerto Rico's interest to those of private organizations
and municipalities, saying, "There is no doubt that Puerto Rico's
interest in this litigation compares favorably to interests of the private
organizations, and municipality, in the cases cited above."187 Thus, for
Justice Brennan at least, organizations, states, and municipalitiesall
had representational legitimacy.1 88 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit
has suggested municipalities can have standing if they can meet the
requirements of associational standing, stating that "where a municipal
corporation seeks to vindicate the rights of its residents, there is no
reason why the general rule on organizational standing should not be
followed."1 89
The initial threshold matter is whether a city is, in fact, an
"association."19 0 It is becoming fairly evident that, whether or not they
have always been so, cities have become associations. 191 In the current
political order, cities are "distinct, democratic communities of interest.
Even the Supreme Court of the United States has at times described
cities this way." 192 They are acknowledged as "sites of association," as
distinct "polities," 1 9 3 and as "important political institutions that are
directly responsible for shaping the contours of 'ordinary civic life in a
free society.' "194 As Richard Briffault put it:
Localities are not simply arbitrary collections of small groups of people who happen to buy
public services or engage in public decision making together. They are often communities,
that is, groups of people with shared concerns and values, tied up with the history and
circumstances of the particular places in which they are located. People live in localities,
raise their children there, and share many interests related to their homes, families, and
immediate neighborhoods. Much of the power of the idea of home rule is connected to the

186. Caruso, supra note 7, at 75.
187. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring).
188. See also Caruso, supra note 7, at 66.
189. City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 1976). Milwaukee v. Saxbe is
somewhat odd in that the court raised the issue of the city's standing sua sponte. Id. at 697. The
court used the analogy to organizations to find that the city did not have standing, but the analogy
remains apt. Id. at 697-98. Although the Seventh Circuit accepted that cities could in some
circumstances achieve associational standing, the D.C. Circuit in City of Olmstead Falls v. Federal
Aviation Administration, 292 F.3d 261, 267-68 (D.C. Cir. 2002) held the opposite. See also Caruso,
supra note 7, at 74-75.
190. Caruso, supra note 7, at 76.
191. Caruso, supranote 7, at 77-78 (arguing that the city-resident relationship should satisfy
requirements to treat city residents as members of a city association); see also Josh Bendor,
Municipal ConstitutionalRights: A New Approach, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 389, 391 (2013).
192. Barron, supra note 10, at 2238.
193. Bendor, supra note 191, at 391.
194. David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: TRaces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 487, 490 (1999) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
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idea of the locality as "home" and of the distinctive connection of government as "rule"
with place-based association. 195

Indeed, through its physical situs, a city is a "specialized
group-though geographically rather than (necessarily) ideologically or
economically specialized." 19 6 And, as Carol M. Rose has suggested,
living in a "locality presents a choice," even more so than states or
nations.197 In many ways, municipal "residence . .. [is] a reflection of
one's own needs and wants."19 8 People tend to "emotionally affiliate
with their city of residence," and "[a] city can argue that its residents
chose where to live" and who "to affiliate with," and thus, in some sense,
have also chosen "to be represented by[] that city." 199 Indeed, "the idea
that cities compete for capital and residents," and residents sort
themselves accordingly, has been relied on in "local government
scholarship and even some case law." 2 0 0 Such mobility, for some
commentators, makes these "territorially based relations akin to
voluntary contracts." 2 01 When people "move to a given city [they may
bring] certain expectations-such as a safe environment or a health
care safety net-and may expect cities to defend those expectations
however necessary." 202 Moreover, "city residents alone elect, comprise,
and at least partially finance their local government. This gives city
residents a better claim to 'membership' than many members of
litigating associations, who may donate to an organization but have no
real further hand in its activities." 20 3
After clearing this threshold hurdle, many plaintiff city claims
could plausibly meet the three-part test for associational standing. 204
To meet the first prong and show that a city's "members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right," 205 a city attorney
could "readily present the individual stories of multiple residents to
show both the breadth of the harm and the concreteness of the

195. Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 259 (2004).
196. Caruso, supra note 7, at 74.
197. Id. at 76 n.94 (citing Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the FederalistEmpire:
Anti-federalism from the Attack on "Monarchism"to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74, 9798 (1989)).
198. Id. at 76 n.94.
199. Id. at 76.
200. Id.
201. Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (a History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 844
(1999).
202. Caruso, supra note 7, at 77.
203. Id. at 78.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 75 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
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injury." 2 06 To meet the second prong and show that the interests being
protected are germane to the city's purposes, cities could point to their
grants of home rule, which often explicitly state the purposes of cities, 2 0 7
and to numerous court decisions stating that one of the city's purposes
is to "protect the 'health and welfare' of their residents." 208 To meet the
third prong and show that neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members, cities could
show that the suit was "properly authorized" and that the proceeding
was generally consistent with "the important policy considerations
behind associational standing." 209
c. Special Standing for Public Nuisance
For plaintiff city claims that rely on public nuisance, an
additional font of standing is sometimes available. In the particular
context of public nuisance cases, the common law has traditionally
210
offered a kind of plenary public nuisance standing to municipalities.
In many judicial common law decisions, courts have held that "local
governmental bodies have the ability to commence public nuisance
actions on their own, independent of grants of power by the
legislature." 2 1 1 In these cases, "regardless of whether the city suffered
some harm to its own interests," courts "did not question the 'standing'
of municipal plaintiffs." 2 1 2 Instead, they "simply assessed these claims
on the merits to determine whether the municipal plaintiff had, in fact,
proven that the defendant was causing a public nuisance." 2 13 Although
this traditional common law standing rarely receives mention by
contemporary courts, it suggests that municipalities bringing public
nuisance claims might legitimately be subject to a different kind of
206. Id. at 75.
207. Id. at 82 n.123 (explaining that "[a] home rule unit may exercise any power and perform
any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to
regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare . . . ." (second alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing ILL. CONST. art VII, § 6), and that
"[a]lthough the Illinois Constitution refers to regulating rather than litigating in the public
interest, the provision still illuminates the 'purpose' of a city").
208. Id. at 82 & n.123 (describing the holding of City of Stamps v. ALCOA, Inc., No. CIV. 051049, 2006 WL 2254406, at *4-8 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 7, 2006) as "finding that a city satisfied the
organizational standing requirements and that a suit for site cleanup was germane to the city's
purpose, 'which is, at least in part, to provide for the welfare of its citizens under its police
powers' ").

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 80-81.
Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs, supra note 16, at 43.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
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standing test, one that would not require them to demonstrate that they
"suffered some special and individualized injury sufficient to grant ...
standing under the Lujan analysis." 214 Rather than the so-called
private-law model for standing, which "espouses a view of standing
recognizing only the types of 'cases' and 'controversies' that were
available under 'traditional' causes of action, and typically requires
some sort of direct harm to a litigant in order for that litigant to have
standing to sue," this public-law model would "recognize[] municipal
plaintiffs as the proper parties to challenge . . the action of private
actors carrying out a public nuisance." 2 15
Public nuisance standing and associational standing are
legitimate possibilities for establishing plaintiff city standing. However,
unless statutory standing is available, cities are "most likely in their
strongest position when they characterize the injuries they suffer as
'private' harms," rooted in the rights of property ownership, rather than
as "harms suffered by them as 'public,'-that is, governmentallitigants." 216 Courts are generally more receptive when the legal harm
focuses on the city as property owner or tax collector, "even when other
forces might also negatively affect" property values. 217 The
entanglement of public and private inherent in most plaintiff city
claims means that plaintiff cities can often accentuate the private
nature of the injury, and reasonably characterize the harm as
impacting the city's direct or proprietary interests.
2. Public Nuisance
Along with standing issues, plaintiff city detractors argue that
public nuisance is an illegitimate cause of action. 218 To be clear, many
plaintiff city claims do not actually rely on public nuisance at all, or if
they do, they do not rely on it exclusively, 219 so this critique is somewhat
limited in scope. In the abstract, public nuisance can at first sound like
"[t]he best 'general' legal theory available to all cities." 220 It protects
214. Id. at 45.
215. Id. at 8. Brescia notes that "at least two federal circuit courts have already held that
municipalities have standing in their own right to pursue public nuisance actions under federal
common law." Id. at 44. The two cases are Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 582 F.3d
309 (2d Cir. 2009), affd in part and rev'd in part, 564 U.S. 410 (2011); and City of Evansville v.
Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979).
216. Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs, supra note 16, at 9.

217. Id.
218. This critique is generally not limited to when cities are plaintiffs, but is made in relation
to any government entity bringing such a claim. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 21.
219. Id. at 749-53.
220. Morris, supra note 1, at 202.
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against "an 'unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public,' including 'interference with the public health, the
public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public
convenience.' "221 It often allows for "flexible fault and causation
doctrines," 222 sometimes creating space for "epidemiological harms":
those that "can be established at the population level [through the tools
of public health], but not necessarily at the individual level." 22 3
Although public nuisance seems attractive in theory, in practice,
state and local governments "have been largely stymied in their efforts
to use public nuisance litigation against harmful industries to vindicate
collectively held, common law rights to non-interference with public
health and safety." 2 24 While the recent appellate victory in the lead
paint litigation may signal a shift in public nuisance's usefulness, public
nuisance has thus far been mostly unsuccessful.225

The flexibility of public nuisance doctrine has, ironically, been
one of the biggest impediments to its success. Many courts have
dismissed public nuisance claims on the paradoxical basis that these
claims are too powerful. For instance, one court dismissed a gun
litigation suit because allowing the "common-law public nuisance cause
of action . .. [would] open the courthouse doors to a flood of limitless,
similar theories of public nuisance. . . against a wide and varied array"
of potential defendants. 226 Another court stated that if gun litigation
could proceed as a public nuisance claim, it "would become a monster
that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort." 2 2 7 This alleged
221. Wiley, supranote 25, at 232 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. LAW
INST. 1979)).
222. Id. at 247.
223. Id. at 213.
224. Id. at 207.
225. Id. at 239-40:
The 'watershed event' for industry-wide public nuisance litigation came in the 1990s,
when several state attorneys general added public nuisance claims to their suits against
tobacco manufacturers, shortly before the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) was
reached. Most of these suits did not produce a court ruling prior to the MSA, but one
federal district court did rule on a public nuisance claim in Texas v. American Tobacco
Co.. . . The federal district court dismissed the claim on the grounds that it was
unsupported by Texas case law. Overall, however, the MSA was hailed as an enormous
achievement by the state attorneys general. Many have pointed to this practical success
as generating a groundswell of interest in public nuisance litigation, even though it had
not produced any court opinions supporting its use.
226. People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 196 (App. Div. 2003); see
also Ausness, supranote 15, at 852.
227. Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540 (3d
Cir. 2001) (quoting Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993));
see also Daniel Fisher, Lead-PaintRuling Helps Push Californiato Top of U.S. 'JudicialHellholes'
List, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2015, 12:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/12/17/lead-
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fear that public nuisance could become too large has tempered public
nuisance's potential potency.
Complimenting these concerns with public nuisance as a cause
of action, there is a school of scholarship that debates the "true nature"
of public nuisance law. Virtually all commentators agree that in its
early common law form, public nuisance protected things like "the right
to safely walk along public highways, to breathe unpolluted air, to be
undisturbed by large gatherings of disorderly people and to be free from
the spreading of infectious diseases." 228 From this history, some
scholars argue that public nuisance is a property-based action 229 or a
special form of public action, 230 some emphasize its quasi-criminal
aspects, 23 1 some argue it is simply a tort,232 and others argue that it is
not a tort at all, but is instead an exercise of police power. 233
These scholarly contests are best resolved by acknowledging
that these categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and public
nuisance may have. elements of each of these identified features,
without any single one defining the cause of action in its entirety. 234
Plaintiff city claims fit into this plurality of public nuisance categories.
The lead litigation is at its heart about property-whether paint
companies should have to pay to remediate the properties that contain
toxic paint. 235 And focusing on the quasi-criminal nature of traditional
public nuisance reveals an interesting feature of plaintiff city claims:
many of them retain some of this quasi-criminal nature. In both the
mortgage and opioid contexts, defendant corporations were also
prosecuted criminally. Criminal charges were brought in the opioid
paint-ruling-helps-push-california-to-top-of-u-s-chambers-judicial-hellholes-list/#79e4ee2fl936
[https://perma.cc/72NT-W7KE] (discussing the influx of class action litigation in California);
Kimberly Stone, PublicNuisance Lawsuits Spiralingout of Control, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June
14, 2016, 4:06 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/commentary/sdut-publicnuisance-lawsuits-2016jun14-story.html [https://perma.cc/3T2Z-3TG8 (discussing the influx of
public nuisance lawsuits in California).
228. Joseph W. Cleary, Municipalities Versus Gun Manufacturers: Why Public Nuisance
ClaimsJust Do Not Work, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 273, 277 (2002), quoted in Victor E. Schwartz & Phil
Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: MaintainingRational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45
WASHBURN L.J. 541, 543-44 (2006).
229. Gifford, supra note 21, at 818.
23Q. Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. TORT L., no. 2, 2011, at 1, 11.
231. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 105, at 96 (arguing that "the conduct that [public nuisance]
enjoins is a crime as well as a tort").
232. Gifford, supra note 21, at 820.
233. Margaret S. Thomas, Parens Patriae and the States' Historic Police Power, 69 S1MU L.
REV. 759, 790 (2016).
234. Albert C. Lin, Public Trust and Public Nuisance: Common Law Peas in a Pod?, 45 U.C.
DAVIS. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2012).
235. See supra Section I.A.2.
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context, and "[i]n 2007, Purdue pleaded guilty to criminal charges of
misleading physicians, regulators and the public about the drug's
addictive qualities." 236 Purdue paid $634.5 million dollars to resolve the
case, and "[t]hree company executives were also charged with felonies
but avoided paying fines." 2 3 7 The subprime mortgage crisis resulted in
very few successful criminal prosecutions, 2 38 but it was widely agreed
that much of the preceding activity was criminal. 239
Plaintiff city claims thus often function like "crimtorts," which
are "civil actions that simultaneously advance societal purposes such as
punishment, deterrence, and the social control of corporate
wrongdoers." 2 4 0 As Professors Rustad and Koenig explain, crimtorts
attempt to "vindicate [the] societal injuries" that lax or nonexistent
regulation and "the limitations of the criminal justice system" leave
unaddressed. 24 1 Many state attorney general parens patriae actions are
crimtorts and thus "fill in the interstices between criminal law, tort law,
and regulation." 2 4 2 Plaintiff city claims are starting to fulfill this role as
well.
To succeed on a public nuisance theory, plaintiff cities generally
have to establish that there was an unreasonable interference with a
public right, which directly resulted in an injury, and that the injury

236. Lenny Bernstein, Pfizer Agrees to Truth in Opioid Marketing, WASH. POST (July 5, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nationalhealth-science/pfizer-agrees-to-truth-in-opioidmarketing/2016/07/05/784223cc-42c6-11e6-88d0-6adee48be8bc.story.html?utmterm=
.e57517e9e274 [https://perma.cc/44S-LLM8].
237. Chris Elkins, Kentucky Takes Purdue Pharma to Court over OxyContin Addiction,
7, 2015), https://www.drugwatch.com/2015/12/07/purdue-pharma-and(Dec.
DRUGWATCH
oxycontin-addiction/ [https://perma.cclC45X-98AK].
238. One small New York City bank that mostly served the Asian American community was
prosecuted. See Alan Yu, After 2008 FinancialCrisis, Only One Bank Faced Criminal Charges.
Why?, WHYY (June 9, 2017), https://whyy.org/articles/after-2008-financial-crisis-only-one-bankfaced-criminal-charges-why/ [https://perma.cc/T9EP-KGS8] (discussing the racial bias Chinese
Americans faced during the Great Recession investigation).
239. See, e.g., William D. Cohan, How Wall Street's Bankers Stayed out of Jail,ATLANTIC (Sept.
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/how-wall-street-bankers-stayed2015),
out-of-jail/399368 [https://perma.cclG6Z8-G27D] (discussing how bankers avoided criminal
prosecution after the 2008 financial crisis); Matt Taibbi, Why Isn't Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING
STONE (Feb. 16, 2011), www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216
[https://perma.cclMX73-RS8L] (explaining why some bankers did not face criminal prosecution).
240. Rustad & Koenig, supranote 105, at 95.
241. Id. at 96.
242. Id. Public nuisance tends to become popular during times of regulatory failure. For
instance, the "'comprehensive statutory and regulatory' reform of the New Deal era limited the
need to utilize the tort of public nuisance to correct social ills." Matthew R. Watson, Note,
Venturing into the "ImpenetrableJungle" How California'sExpansive Public Nuisance Doctrine
May Result in an Unprecedented Judgment Against the Lead Paint Industry in the Case of County
of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 612, 616 (2010).
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was to the "city itself" (not just to its constituents). 2 4 3 But even before
getting to these elements, there are initial arguments over what counts
as "public" in public nuisance. 244 Courts generally insist that the
"public" part of public nuisance is not synonymous with "widespread." 2 4 5
In other words, mere "aggregated private harms" are not equivalent to
a public nuisance: 246 there must be something about the right that "is
collective in nature." 2 4 7 The question is whether "the harm to health
and welfare caused by industries that manufacture and distribute
dangerous products [can] be legitimately understood as interference
with a public right?" 248 Usually, impairing public health or safety,
which plaintiff city claims often allege, is understood to satisfy this
collective requirement. 249
Public nuisance actions allow for a long temporal span and a
longer backward look than many other causes of action. In this sense,
public nuisance is particularly well-suited to the "slow violence" nature
of plaintiff city claims. Statute of limitations problems often plague
actions alleging harms which arose long after the injurious conduct, 25 0
but "[p]ublic nuisance allows plaintiffs to focus on harm occurring
today, even if the product was used a long time ago" and the
"manifestation of harm is delayed." 25 1
However, this positive feature comes with a cost: it creates
difficulties for the causation requirement. "[T]he causation requirement
significantly limits cities' ability to halt and remedy corporate
malfeasance," 2 5 2 and many public nuisance suits are dismissed on the
basis of no causation. 25 3 As one scholar wrote in the context of gun
litigation, many courts recognized "the substantial public costs" and
significant harm of gun violence. 254 But they required a "more 'direct'
causal link" connecting "specific gun-industry conduct . ..

to such

243. Morris, supra note 1, at 202.
244. Wiley, supra note 25, at 212.
245. Id. at 254 (quoting Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. S199, S204 (2003)).
246. Wiley, supra note 25, at 255.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 233-34.
249. Id. at 212.
250. Is the Public Nuisance Universe Expanding?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/public-nuisance-universe-n57982083122/ [https://perma.cc/2KE7-CG9W]
251. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Professor Albert C. Lin).
252. Morris, supra note 1, at 202.
253. Eric L. Kintner, Note, Bad Apples and Smoking Barrels: Private Actions for Public
Nuisance Against the Gun Industry, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1163, 1166-67 (2005).
254. Id. at 1167 & n.9.
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harm," or a showing that the gun industry had" 'control' over [ ] the gun
violence that result[ed] in harm to the public." 2 5 5

Some courts, however, have been open to plaintiff city public
nuisance claims. 256 As noted above, the Californian city and county
consortium's victory in the lead paint litigation relied on public
nuisance. Some of the gun litigation (before the legislative prohibition)
was allowed to proceed on a public nuisance basis, 257 and several more
contemporary cases, particularly those alleging environmental harm,
have also withstood challenges to their public nuisance basis. 258 These
successes, while perhaps relatively few and far between, demonstrate
that although not every case will successfully make out the element of
public nuisance, the cause of action is generally accepted and within the
bounds of legal legitimacy.
3. Causation
Causation challenges in plaintiff city claims are not limited to
the public nuisance context, and causation is often the most difficult
part of any plaintiff city claim. This critique is thus trenchant, but it
identifies a challenge of the traditional American legal system writ
large, rather than a particular shortcoming of plaintiff city claims.
259
American law focuses on "the centrality of individuals over groups,"
and, accordingly, tort law as currently constituted does a much better
job of handling individual issues. Tort law emphasizes "individual
2 60
and
plaintiffs, individual causation, and individual responsibility,"
6
1
2
plaintiff city claims are an awkward fit within this mold.

255. Id. at 1167.
256. Is the PublicNuisance Universe Expanding?, supra note 251.
257. These cases include White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000); City
of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003); James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820
A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); and City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d
1136 (Ohio 2002). See also Ausness, supra note 15, at 872 (discussing gun-related public nuisance
claims).
258. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 564 U.S. 410 (2011); City of Evansville v. Ky. Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d
1008 (7th Cir. 1979).
259. WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 65 (2009).

260. Id.
261. Indeed, mass torts in general struggle with this. Mass tort claims arise from
injuries inflicted on a wide range of people, often from a particular product, practice, or
action. . . . According to [Deborah Hensler's] definition, mass torts share some of the
following features: numerosity, commonality, interdependence of case values,
controversy over causation, emotional or political heat, and higher than average claim
rate.... The more important hallmarks of the mass torts approach are class action
treatment; multi-district litigation procedures; aggregating techniques used to
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Plaintiff city claims are based on a series of collectivities: many
constituents, together, and those many constituents and a city,
together. 262 Individual causation requirements do not map well onto
these collective or public health harms. While public health has led to a
greater acceptance of using "statistical and epidemiological evidence" in
some contexts, 263 courts have generally been "reluctan[t] to dispense
with notions of individual responsibility and individual causation." 264
The "ontological shift[] from individual to population," which looking
at things in the collective or from a public health perspective requires,
"creates significant tension both within the population perspective and
between it and much of American law, which largely reflects the
influence of liberal individualism." 26 5
Moreover, parsing out how much of a social injury is due to
corporate wrongdoing, and how much may be due to other factors, is a
difficult task. In the opioid context, for instance, opioid deaths have
sometimes been described as "deaths of despair": deaths less about
fraudulent marketing by pharmaceutical corporations and more about
a response to "economic dispossession" and "erosion in . ..

wages,

marriage rates, job quality, social cohesion, cultural capital, and

adjudicate questions of liability, causation and damages, as well as to establish
mechanisms for compensating plaintiffs through settlement; and collaboration among
plaintiffs' and defense counsel handling similar cases to share information about claims
values, relevant evidence, discovery strategy, litigation strategy, expert witnesses, and
to spread and share the costs of litigation. Many of these aspects of the mass tort
approach are present in mass torts litigation because significant economies of scale can
be achieved through their use ....
Brescia, supra note 58, at 13--14 (footnotes omitted).
262. There is another additional, important collective layer often at play as well: many
plaintiff city claims are pursued through informal litigation networks of cities and sometimes other
interest or advocacy groups. See infra Section W.A.
263. PARMET, supra note 259, at 230.
264. Id. at 231. The debate regarding the appropriateness of market-share liability reflects
this. Since the courts used market-share liability in the DES cases twenty-five years ago, they
have been strongly reluctant to expand the use of that approach to cases involving other products,
albeit with some exceptions such as lead paint. Id. at 229.
265. Id. at 19-20; see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Mass Tort Class Actions-Past, Present, and
Future, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1004 (2017):
From the perspective of tort doctrine, epidemiology has a significant drawback: It
cannot be used to prove specific causation but instead is only able to show risk and
probability. This is a problem because tort law is focused on the specific cause of an
individual plaintiffs realized harm, rather than on the risk of harm.
(footnote omitted). Scientific developments, though, can sometimes assist, as they do in
environmental litigation. As one commentator phrased it, it is now possible to look at a PCB in the
water and say, "these are Monstanto's PCB's." Is the Public Nuisance Universe Expanding?,supra
note 251.
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perhaps, racial privilege." 266 New research, however, suggests that
"economic conditions can explain only 10 percent of the increase in drug
overdose deaths since 1999,"267 but the calculus and ascription of
causation involved with the enormous temporal, geographical, and
demographic scope of these harms is no easy feat in any of these
contexts.
As we saw in Miami v. Bank of America, where the Court
imposed a stringent causation standard on a Fair Housing Act claim,
courts are frequently unsure that plaintiff city actions can meet
traditional causation requirements. 2 6 8 Nevertheless, legal legitimacy
does not require legal success. Rather, it only demands that a case fall
generally within the established parameters of being worthy of
determination. 26 9 While causation may, in some plaintiff city cases,
prove a challenging obstacle, some plaintiff city claims have overcome
it, and it seems likely that at least some others eventually will as
well. 270
B. Moral or PoliticalLegitimacy
Critics of plaintiff city claims have issued three main critiques
that sound in the moral or political legitimacy register. One concern is
the role that plaintiff cities play "in the larger political order," 271 and
the extent to which they advance certain accepted political and moral
values, including democracy. Critics argue that plaintiff city claims are
problematic because they bind dissenters, they bypass democratic
regulation, and they .are a task best left to states. These arguments
falter in the following ways: first, plaintiff city claims do, in some sense,
bind dissenters, but no more so than occurs in any number of analogous
contexts in which the practice is accepted as legitimate. Second, the
argument that plaintiff cities bypass democratic regulation fails to
acknowledge that the only parties affected are those who choose to be
bound by the negotiated terms of a settlement agreement, and it does
not account for why cities should be any less entitled to negotiate these

266. Eric Levitz, Did Americans Turn to Opioids Out of Despair-orJust Because They Were
There?, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 16, 2018, 12:00 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/01/is-theopioid-crisis-driven-by-supply-or-demand.html [https://perma.cclQB3L-K6X9].
267. Id.
268. As one commentator noted, "[W]hat [the case] leaves open right now is, can cities who
brought this kind of case establish the kind of proximate cause the court has flagged in this
decision?" Farmer, supranote 67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. Fallon, supranote 150, at 1819.
270. See, e.g., People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 598 (Ct. App. 2017).
271. Lahav, supra note 151, at 3194.
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settlements than any other litigating party. Finally, because of the
structural relationship between cities and states, states almost always
have the legal authority to prohibit or prevent city litigation (though
whether they can feasibly do so as a political matter is a different
question).
1. Binding Dissenters
For some critics, plaintiff cities raise democratic concerns. One
problem involves the possibility of dissenting constituents. 2 72 Some
critics "argue that cities lack the legitimacy to sue on behalf of their
constituents and bind them to positions with which some may
disagree." 273 To be sure, it would be highly unlikely that every single
constituent would wish to support every single plaintiff city claim. It is
even entirely possible that "not all cities have a majority of constituents
who would want their city law offices to pursue public interest cases." 2 7 4
Indeed, there are specific examples of constituent interests not always
aligning: in Cincinnati, "a group of citizens . . . threatened to sue the
city for misuse of public funds if its safe gun lawsuit went forward," and
in Texas, the Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse organization regularly
"opposes Houston's affirmative litigation efforts." 275
Internal disagreement within a polis or an organization,
however, happens in virtually every context where there is a collective
component to litigation. In these other contexts, though, we accept this
as politically legitimate. Neither "parens patriae [nor] associational
standing doctrine . .
require perfect consensus." 276 Parens patriae
requires only that "a problem ... impact a 'substantial portion' of a
state's population, and an attorney general need not have anyone in
particular's blessing to sue." 2 7 7 Associational standing doctrine also

272. There might also be dissenting voices in municipal government: "[T]he city government,
with dozens of elected officials, does not always speak with one voice." Michael A. Cardozo, The
New York City CorporationCounsel: The Best Legal Job in America, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 459,
465 (2008).
273. Morris, supra note 148, at 62.
274. Morris, supra note 1, at 190 (emphasis added).
275. Gavioli, supra note 16, at 967 n.169.
276. Caruso, supra note 7, at 79.
277. Id.
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allows for a plurality of opinions. 2 7 8 The same standard can fairly be
applied to plaintiff cities. 279
Moreover, dissension can also occur when cities defend
themselves in litigation. When cities mount vigorous, expensive
defenses in response to allegations of police brutality or other civil
rights violations, many citizens would prefer that cities instead
acknowledge these harms, settle the claim for an appropriate amount,
and adopt safer procedures for the future. 280 Nevertheless, just as
plaintiff city actions bind dissenters, the litigative choices of defendant
cities do so as well.
Indeed, the vocal resistance of plaintiff city claim detractors can
be heralded as a moment of democratic deliberation. 2 81 It ensures that
the issue will be discussed publicly, with both sides offering their
viewpoints.
2. Bypassing Democratic Regulation
One reason why cities turn to litigation is because they are
unable to regulate the harmful conduct. City leaders have sometimes
explicitly stated that failed attempts to regulate have driven them to
seek alternatives, one of which is litigation. 282 Because of industry
capture and limitations on their legislative authority, cities often
cannot implement ordinances to target the wrongs that most impact
their residents and themselves. 283 Although cities often seem powerful
in the cultural imagination, in truth, "[wlhat is striking about city

278. Id. This does not present a problem for associational standing, either: "The presence of
contradictory interests within an association does not create problems under prong (c)." Bendor,
supranote 191, at 421 n.214 (citing Nat'l Mar. Union v. Commander, Military Sealift Command,
824 F.2d 1228, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
279. See Bendor, supra note 191, at 420 n.214 ("A municipality will usually be able to meet the
three-prong test for associational standing.").
280. See, e.g., Giri Nathan, James Blake Settles NYC Police Brutality Case on Condition that
City Creates Fellowship to Take on Cop Misconduct, DEADSPIN (June 23, 2017),
http://deadspin.com/james-blake-withdraws-his-claim-in-nyc-police-brutality-1796368567
[https://perma.cc/3JRX-NVHD] (noting that Blake "had a sound case against the city," but chose
to withdraw his claim and pass up a considerable settlement on the condition that the city
establish a legal fellowship to perform outreach in neighborhoods with a high volume of police
complaints).
281. See Lahav, supra note 151, at 3203.
282. "For example, in the New Orleans [gun] litigation, Mayor Marc Morial stated that a
motivation for the gun litigation was the city's failed lobbying attempts in the state legislature."
Gavioli, supra note 16, at 951.
283. For example, "a number of cities attempted to regulate lending standards in the lead-up
to the sub-prime mortgage crisis, but state courts invalidated municipal predatory lending laws as
inappropriate exercises of local power." Schragger, supra note 9, at 110.
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power is how constrained it actually is."284 Their "legislative efforts" are
easily thwarted and "subject to challenge under preemption and powers
doctrines." 285 Indeed, "[a] city's legislative departures from state
legislation will be deftly torpedoed by a preemption challenge when that
departure affects a business interest," 286 and municipalities are
generally "severely limited in their ability to act against commercial
interests that cause harm to their communities." 287
The turn to litigation as a solution, however, is not an affront to
democracy. First, the idea that regulation is somehow more purely
"democratic" is belied by contemporary political realities. Taking the
opioid epidemic as an example, the lack of regulation over opioids was
not because of the political will of the people. Instead, it was the result
of a massive financial operation to discourage any regulatory efforts.
The Associated Press and the Center for Public Integrity report that
opioid manufacturers "spent more than $880 million" in antiregulatory
lobbying efforts over the last decade, "supported 7,100 candidates for
state-level offices[,
and funded an average of 1,350 lobbyists
2 88
nationwide."
This easily dwarfed the $4 million spent on the other
side, by those in favor of increased opioid regulation. 289
Second, the American system of political and legal governance is
set up to rely on litigation as a mode of governance. America is rooted
in what Robert Kagan "famously described" as "adversarial legalism,"
meaning that "lawyer-dominated litigation" is a primary means of
"policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution." 2 9 0 The
powerful role of litigation in American society is a deliberate choice of
legislators: "private litigation [is] a means of enforcing or even
establishing government policy"2 9 1 because legislators often want it to
be.292

Third, the choice to settle under terms that look like regulation
is one that corporate defendants can choose to take or forego. Corporate
284. Id. at 93.
285. Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer
ProtectionLaws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1903, 1912 (2013).
286. Id. (footnotes omitted).
287. Engel, supra note 59, at 611.
288. Charles Lane, A Mega-Case Puts Opioids on Trial, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-mega-case-puts-opioids-on-trial/2016/10/05/
d8409a6c-8bl2-11e6-875e-2clbfe943b66_story.html?utmterm=.3db48b089ef0
[https://perma.cc/
PWU5-RDV4].
289. Id.
290. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 (2001).

291. Staszak, supra note 93, at 78.
292. Paul Nolette attributes the rise of states bringing an increasing amount of litigation to
both adversarial legalism and cooperative federalism. See generally NOLETIE, supra note 22.
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defendants have massive, sophisticated means of assessing what sort of
risk tolerance they are comfortable with and what actions are in their
best interest. They typically have more legal and economic resources
available than cities do 2 9 3 and could easily continue a path of litigation
if they thought that would yield a better outcome. As sophisticated,
well-resourced parties and skilled negotiators, their choice to be bound
by particular terms is not aptly described as "undemocratic." 2 9 4
Corporations weigh the likelihood of legal liability against the terms of
a negotiated settlement, and make an independent decision that best
serves their interests. 295
Moreover, the lever that creates the possibility of litigation
functioning as regulation is a violation of existing law. 296 The regulatory
effects of litigation are only possible when corporations open themselves
up to litigation through wrongdoing. And only these specific parties are
bound by the terms of the agreement: a negotiated settlement has no
impact on other industry actors not party to the lawsuit. 2 97

3. City-State Tensions
In contemporary America, cities are no longer tiny microcosms of
states (if in fact they ever were). Many have their own independent
political identities. Arguably, cities are the new states: "[T]he states'
role as our most salient community has decreased," 298 and states "no
longer play the role in today's polity that they did at the time of the
Founders." 299 In many instances, cities now occupy that politically
salient role. And cities may differ from states in their understanding of
what harms most affect themselves and their constituents. 3 0 0 "Home

293. See infra Part III.
294. John Abraham, Scientific Expertise and Regulatory Decision-Making: Standards,
Evidential Interpretation and Social Interests in the Pharmaceutical Sector, in EXPERTISE IN
REGULATION AND LAw 51, 55 (Gary Edmond ed., 2017).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Caruso, supranote 7, at 87.
299. Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms,Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to
Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 187, 209-11 (2010), quoted in
Caruso, supra note 7, at 87.
300. See Barron, supra note 10, at 2239 n.77:
The City of Santa Cruz's amicus brief in [Lockyear v. City & County of San Francisco,
95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004)] suggested that cities, by virtue of their closeness to the
community and their responsibility for carrying out myriad governmental functionsfrom law enforcement to schooling-are acutely aware of the social consequences of
constitutional judgments. For that reason, the city argued, cities might be expected to
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rule government is based on the theory that local governments are in
the best position to assess the needs and desires of the community and,
thus, can most wisely enact legislation addressing local concerns." 301 It
is no great stretch to say that this applies to litigation addressing local
concerns, as well.
In the regulatory context, "federal, state, and local
[governments] have sometimes collaborated and sometimes competed
for regulatory pieces of various problems." 302 Again, the same holds true
in the litigation context. Collaboration is a frequent occurrence in the
often multilevel attempts to redress major social harms. For instance,
in the opioid litigation, plaintiff cities are not the only litigants:
individuals, classes of individuals, and states have all brought claims,
and sometimes they have shared expertise. 303 Thus far, the individual
suits have "almost always failed because the company has successfully
argued lack of causation, misuse, wrongful conduct and expiration of
the statute of limitations." 3 0 4 Class actions on this front "have also
failed, primarily because class representatives have been unable to
satisfy the Rule 23 requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality
and adequacy."3 0 5 States' parens patriae suits, to date, "have been
somewhat more successful, despite the weakness of their doctrinal
foundations, primarily because the company has chosen to settle these
suits in order to avoid the bad publicity and expense of protracted
litigation." 3 06 Plaintiff city suits often draw from the legal expertise
developed in these other suits, and many city and state suits coexist
peacefully. Even in these situations of peacefully coexisting claims,
there is still value in cities proceeding independently. When issues are
''sensitive or politically contentious," consensus at the local level might
happen "long before a statewide one, and so the city may be easier to

have insight into the actual lived consequences of a ban on same-sex marriage well
before the state as a whole would.
301. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 267-68 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Josh
Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 127 n.243 (2013).
302. Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern
Administrative State, 91 WASH. L. REV. 637, 638 (2016).
303. The federal government, too, is trying new approaches to the problem, such as declaring
the opioid epidemic a national emergency in August 2017. Joel Achenbach, John Wagner & Lenny
Bernstein, Trump Says Opioid CrisisIs a NationalEmergency, Pledges More Money and Attention,
WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-declares-opioidcrisis-is-a-national-emergency-pledges-more-money-and-attention20l7/08/10/5aaaae32-7dfe11e7-83c7-5bd5460mfd7e-story.html?utm.term=.f2ee67d52f54 [https://perma.cc/CCN6-5HfVT].
304. Ausness, supra note 167, at 1165.
305. Id.
306. Id. (concluding that the overall effectiveness of civil litigation in this area is highly
questionable).
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mobilize to action than a state." 307 Because cities are so "close to the

ground," 308 they often can best ensure that the needs of communities
and constituencies are met.
Sometimes, though, plaintiff city suits and state suits are in
competition. Such was the case in State v. City of Dover.309 There, both
cities and the state of New Hampshire had sued various defendants for
the harms caused by the gasoline additive MTBE. The State sued to
have the city stop their suit. The city argued that it "ha[d) a compelling
interest in maintaining separate litigation because the State's suit d[id]
not represent their interests." 310 Specifically, the cities argued that "the
State's suit name[d] fewer defendants, fail[ed] to allege a number of
theories of liability alleged by the cities, fail[ed] to seek the remedies
sought by the cities, and [wa]s subject to defenses based upon the
State's history of regulating MTBE which [we]re not applicable to the
cities." 311 The court ultimately held that the cities' suit "must yield" to
the state's parens patriae suit. 3 12 Even though the "cities were pursuing
different legal theories and seeking different types of compensation,"
the court found that the cities' suit was redundant because "[t]here is
no reason for the Court to conclude . . . that the State will not seek to

obtain full compensation for all communities, including the [c]ities." 313
The court acknowledged that the nature of the compensation that the
State sought differed from that sought by the city, but held that such a
difference was not equivalent to "an interest that is not properly
represented by the State." 3 14

This type of disagreement over the best way to bring litigation
is not uncommon. A similar disagreement over who to sue and which
approach to adopt arose in the opioid litigation context, where the state
of Ohio has sued opioid manufacturers, and two Ohio cities, Dayton and
Lorraine, have sued not only the manufacturers, but also doctors and
distributors. 3 1 5 When asked about the city's decision to litigate despite
the state's action, the mayor of Dayton asserted that the city lacked
faith in the state's approach, claiming the cities were "taking matters
307. Caruso, supra note 7, at 62.
308. Barron, supranote 10, at 2239.
309. 891 A.2d 524, 531 (N.H. 2006).
310. Dover, 891 A.2d at 531.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 531-32.
313. Id. at 531; Lemos, supra note 167, at 509 n.99.
314. Dover, 891 A.2d at 531 (quoting the trial court).
315. See Alan Johnson, Doctors, Cardinal Health Included in Cities' Lawsuits over Opioid
Epidemic, CoLuMBus DISPATCH (June 5, 2017), http://www.dispatch.com/news/20170605/doctorscardinal-health-included-in-cities-lawsuits-over-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cclAH6F-ELK3].
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into our own hands to get things done right ... We can't wait for the
state to do the right thing." 316
In these instances, cities and states both agree that litigation is
appropriate, but they disagree about how to go about it. In other
instances, cities may mobilize because they are unhappy with the
results that states have achieved. The financial disaster caused by the
subprime mortgage crisis, for instance, prompted a response at multiple
levels. Federal and state agencies and attorneys general mobilized to
try to hold the relevant banks and financial entities responsible for the
predatory lending practices and other misconduct that created the
mortgage crisis, but for the most part that action has resulted in
settlements that sound good at first blush, but have been heavily
criticized for being extremely lenient. For instance, in 2012, five major
banks-Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan, and Ally
Financial-settled a federal and forty-nine-state complaint about
fraudulent mortgage practices for what was touted as a $25 billion
settlement. 3 17 However, the fine print revealed that the banks were
actually "on the hook for only $5 billion in cash," a "tiny fraction of the
cost to individuals and communities." 3 1 8 One analyst estimated that
this settlement "set a price for forgeries and fabricating documents" of
approximately $2000 per loan," the "equivalent of a 'rounding error' to
the banks." 3 19 Plaintiff cities were dissatisfied with this achievement,
and have initiated their own litigation instead.
In still other instances, plaintiff cities and states may disagree
about whether litigation is an appropriate response at all. Not
infrequently, cities and states have divergent interests. For instance,
Pennsylvania is currently considering initiating a claim against opioid
manufacturers. But Pennsylvania is "home to 76 firms that
manufacture a variety of drugs and employ 12,700 people," 320 a fact that
many other cities in Pennsylvania may weigh differently than the state.
Further, states may be more subject to industry capture. 321 For
instance, in "a departure from the usual role of the state attorney
316. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
317. Hiltzik, supra note 8.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Steve Esack & Colt Shaw, Pennsylvania Lawmaker Wants to Sue 'Big Pharma' over
Opiate Epidemic, MORNING CALL (June 17, 2016, 11:15 PM), www.mcall.com/news/nationworld/
pennsylvania/mc-pa-drug-company-lawsuit-resolution-20160617-story.html
[https://perma.cc/
625A-6VXK].
321. See id. (noting that "[a] lawsuit against pharmaceutical companies could be much more
difficult, especially in Pennsylvania, home to 76 firms that manufacture a variety of drugs and
employ 12,700 people").
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general, who traditionally sues companies to force compliance with
state law," Republican "attorneys general in at least a dozen states are
working with energy companies and other corporate interests" to "back
lawsuits and other challenges against the Obama administration on
environmental issues, the Affordable Care Act and securities
regulation." 32 2 In return, those companies "are providing them with
record amounts of money for their political campaigns, including at
least $16 million [in 2014]."323 Known as the "Rule of Law campaign,"
these states and attorneys general "operate like a large national law
firm" and join with industries that they regulate (or, perhaps more
accurately, do not regulate) to bring these claims.

32 4

As we saw in the gun litigation context, if states do not want
plaintiff city litigation, they usually have the authority to stop it.325
Policy clashes frequently occur at all levels of government: between city
and state, between state and federal, and between city and federal. 326
Local governments are at the bottom of the governmental hierarchy,
and given this placement, they "are seriously constrained by the
domination of state and corporate imperatives." 3 2 7 States have
significant power over much local government activity, and they
routinely exercise it.328

In this sense, plaintiff city claims are continually bounded by the
state's power to neutralize them. Although whether states have such a
power, whether it is politically feasible to use it in any given moment,
and whether states should continue to have this power in light of the
322. Eric Lipton, Energy Firms in Secretive Alliance with Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/us/politics/energy-firms-in-secretive-alliance-withattorneys-general.html [https:/perma.cc/XB4X-J642].
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. The tobacco litigation Master Settlement Agreement, for example, preempted many
municipal lawsuits. See Kristin E. Cormier, New Tobacco Settlement May End MunicipalLawsuits
in Eight States, NATION'S CITIES WKLY., Nov. 30, 1998, at 25. Some plaintiff city suits are also
preempted by federal legislation, as was the case when Los Angeles's case against JPMorgan for
predatory lending was preempted by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act. See Jonathan Stempel, JPMorganWins Dismissal of Los Angeles Lawsuit over
Mortgage Lending, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2014, 3:17 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usjpmorganchase-losangeles-lawsuit/jpmorgan-wins-dismissal-of-los-angeles-lawsuit-overmortgage-lending-idUSKBNOG62AT20140806 [https://perma.cclZP5W-9EWY]. For a discussion of
city-state powerlessness, see Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057
(1980).
326. See KAGAN, supra note 290, at 23 (detailing policy conflicts between various levels of
government).

327. Iris Marion Young, City Life as a Normative Ideal, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CITY: CLASSIC
TO CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS 163, 169 (Sharon M. Meagher ed., 2008). Cities are typically given
more deference in matters of land use and zoning. Id.
328. See Schragger, supra note 9, at 99 (describing local power under federalism).
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growing importance of cities are all different questions, this framework
provides the structure that plaintiff cities currently operate within.329
Plaintiff cities do lay claim to pursuing justice on behalf of themselves
and their constituents, but they do so from within the confines of this
extant edifice.
C. Sociological Legitimacy
After legal legitimacy and political legitimacy, the third type of
legitimacy is sociological legitimacy. Sociological legitimacy is about
"public acceptance" 330 and "the extent to which members of the relevant
political community regard a law as justified." 33 1 Largely as a result of
the efforts of the probusiness tort reform movement, which seeks to
minimize civil litigation generally, litigation is often maligned in
American popular culture. 332 Stories of abusive or frivolous litigation
abound, and even meritorious suits, like the "hot coffee" case, for
example, are told as tales of plaintiff greed and overreaching. 3 3 3 "Tort
reform long ago declared war on the citizen-initiated complaint
generally," 334 and the city-initiated complaint has been similarly
impugned.
In fact, although the story most often circulated is that America
is an overly litigious society, 335 numerous scholars have demonstrated
that the problem is actually one of too little litigation. 336 Specifically, a
plethora of factors operate to deter those who actually do suffer tortious
injury from bringing suit. First, they often "don't realize that they are

329. There is also the question, of course, whether states should have this power.
330. Michael L. Wells, "SociologicalLegitimacy" in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1011, 1016 (2007).
331. Lahav, supra note 151, at 3195.
332. Cf. id. at 3195-96 (discussing three different forms of measuring legitimacy in law).
333. Id.
334. Anita Bernstein, Complaints, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 37, 47 (2000).
335. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN

THE U.S. 3 (2010).
336. Comparatively, on the international stage the United States "barely cracks the Top 5 of
most litigious countries in the world." Risk Management: The Most Litigious Countries in the
World, CLEMENTS, https://www.clements.com/resources/articles/The-Most-Litigious-Countries-inthe-World (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/E87N-ESR2] [hereinafter Most Litigious
Countries]. On a per capita basis, Germany, Sweden, Israel, and Austria, respectively, win. See
Christian Wollschlager, Exploring Global Landscapes of Litigation, in SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS:
FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERHARD BLANKENBURG ZUM 60 GEBURTSTAG (Jilrgen Brand et al. eds., 1998);
Most Litigious Countries, supra; see also DAVID M. ENGEL, THE MYTH OF THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY:

WHY WE DON'T SUE (2016). And although the popular perception is that tort suits are clogging
courthouses, in fact, by far the most common type of civil litigation in state courts is contractual
disputes. See ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 10 (2017).
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injured." 3 3 7 Particularly when injuries involve the slow violence of toxic
substances like lead, "where . . . years [may] elapse between exposure

and the ultimate manifestation of injury," it is difficult to conceptually
connect those dots. 3 3 8 Moreover, "even if a victim realizes she's hurt, she
may not realize that the injury was tortiously inflicted." 339 Continuing
the lead example, the parents of "a child dismissed as 'slow' may not
realize her trouble is traceable to chipped paint." 3 40 Further, "even
when victims have the information they need to make sensible choices,"
their very injury often prevents many victims from taking action.
"Often suffering from depression, disorientation, and anxiety-and
sometimes overcome by guilt and self-blame-for some injury victims,
'[diecisive action and follow-through may seem nearly impossible.' "341
And
[f]inally, even if an injury victim navigates the various hurdles above and decides to claim,
she still has to overcome several structural impediments to make that desire a reality.
Most notably, she has to know how to find a decent lawyer ... [and] convince the lawyer
to take her case. And that's tough-as the majority of lawyers reject the vast majority of
would-be claimants who come calling. Last but not least, the would-be claimant has to do
342
all of the above within a short period, lest the statute of limitations expire.

As a result of these factors, and because of the significant
psychological and legal consequences of serving as a plaintiff, 3 4 3 many

potential plaintiffs with viable claims simply bear the loss and do not
litigate them.344 In some cases the "harms are [simply] too diffuse" and
"the expense of litigation too great." 345
Plaintiff cities take on responsibility for pursuing claims against
the entities that cause these harms. Doing so has some benefits for
sociological legitimacy. First, "according to a recent 2012 Pew Research
Center poll, Americans trust local governments at a significantly higher
level than both state and federal government." 3 4 6 City attorneys thus

337. Nora Freeman Engstrom, ISO the Missing Plaintiff, JOTWELL (Apr. 12, 2017),
(reviewing
[https://perma.ce/T5W3-TYQE]
https://torts.jotwell.com/iso-the-missing-plaintiffl
ENGEL, supranote 336).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. (quoting ENGEL, supranote 336, at 43).
342. Id.
343. See Pam A. Mueller, Victimhood and Agency: How Taking ChargeTakes its Toll, 44 PEPP.
L. REV. 691 (2017) (examining the psychological and legal toll that participation in the legal system
exacts on victims).
344. ENGEL, supranote 336, at 5.
345. Caruso, supra note 7, at 90, 61.
346. Ray Brescia & John Travis Marshall, Introductionto How CITIES WILL SAVE THE WORLD,
supra note 1, at 1, 8.
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may be able to imbue these claims with sociological legitimacy by virtue
of generally being seen as bona fide actors. With the imprimatur of local
government, city attorneys may be "well positioned to gain the attention
and sympathies of the mass media." 34 7 City actors "are in a strong
position to gain media standing unavailable to private litigators and
thus exert meaningful pressure through their legal mobilization
campaigns." 34 8
Plaintiff city claims also benefit from past litigative moments
that demonstrate that when litigation "produce[s] privately held
industry information that documents important public harms in the
face of regulatory failure ... the litigation is reluctantly acknowledged
as legitimate." 3 4 9 For example, in the asbestos and tobacco cases, "as
information surfaced to validate the claims," the litigation gained in
public acceptance and sociological legitimacy. 35o
Contemporary plaintiff city claims may follow this same
trajectory, with informational
transparency translating into
sociological legitimacy. For instance, a lead plaintiff lawsuit with an
individual plaintiff, filed in 1999, led to the release of a trove of
historical letters and documents offering a series of repugnant and
disturbing revelations regarding what company officials knew about
the toxicity of their product and the populations affected. The
documents showed that in the 1950s, Baltimore city officials "sent
weekly reports to the lead paint industry's top health official ...
alerting him to the harm being caused," and informing him of the
"dozens of Baltimore children dead from lead poisoning." 351 "He
responded with mockery." 352 Referring to those who lived in housing
poisoned by the toxic paint as "Baltimore's little human rodents," he
blamed not the toxicity of his product, but instead the lack of education
of black and minority parents. 353 He joked about the children ingesting
lead paint, acknowledging that "there appears to be all too much 'gnawledge' among Baltimore babies," but refusing to make any industry

347. NOLETTE, supra note 22, at 139.
348. Id.
349. Wendy Wagner, Stubborn Information Problems & the Regulatory Benefits of Gun
Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 27, at 271, 286.
350. Id. at 291.
351. Luke Broadwater, Advocates Say Lead PaintIndustry Should Be Held Liable in Poisoning
of Baltimore Children, BALT. SUN (Feb. 27, 2016, 4:14 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
maryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-ci-lead-poisoning-20160227-story.html [https://perma.cc/QAG92Z6R].
352. Id.
353. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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changes to prevent or curb the toxic exposure. 354 Shortly after these
letters were publicized, numerous media articles were published
denouncing these actions and suggesting that both the litigation that
drove the document discovery and future city litigation are positive
developments. 35 5
Similar revelations occurred in the subprime mortgage context.
Baltimore and Memphis both brought claims that specifically alleged
that Wells Fargo engaged in reverse redlining. 356 In that litigation, the
plaintiffs "produced sworn statements from former Wells Fargo
employees that revealed that bank officials would refer to subprime
loans as 'ghetto loans' and borrowers of color as 'mud people.' "357 These
claims settled, with Wells Fargo "agreeing to make hundreds of millions
of dollars of loans in Memphis and Shelby County and $7 million in
loans in Baltimore." 3 5 8
III. FISCAL FEASIBILITY IN THE AGE OF MINIMAL CITIES

Plaintiff city cases are not only sociologically, morally, and
legally legitimate; they are also fiscally feasible. Well-resourced cities
can pursue litigation through their own city attorney offices or
specialized units. 359 Cities with less financial resources can also pursue
plaintiff city litigation, .albeit through a slightly different means.
Currently, many cities are in significant financial distress, 360 and there
are an unprecedented number of municipal bankruptcies. 3 6 1 Even
though these cities "are often so cash-strapped it may be difficult for
354. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
355. See, e.g., id.
356. Brescia, supra note 66, at 20.
357. Id.; see also Michael Powell, Bank Accused of Pushing Mortgage Deals on Blacks, N.Y.
TIMES (June 6, 2009), www.nytimes.com/2009/06/07/us/07baltimore.html [https://perma.cc/MJV6TP54].
358. Brescia & Marshall, supra note 346, at 20 (citations omitted).
359. See Morris, supra note 1, at 202.
360. See, e.g., Amy Goldstein, In the Tennessee Delta, a Poor Community Loses Its Hospitaland Sense of Security, WASH. PosT (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nationall
health-science/in-the-tennessee-delta-a-poor-community-loses-its-hospital--and-sense-ofsecurity/2017/04/10/6c550492-1941-11e7-855e-4824bbb5d748_story.html?utm-term=
.b69dfcbc44cc [https://perma.cc/XLU7-DEJ2] (discussing the "epidemic of dying hospitals across
rural America").

361. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1120 (2014)
(noting Detroit was "the twenty-eighth city to declare municipal bankruptcy or to enter a
receivership for fiscal crisis since late 2008, a window of time that has seen five of the six largest
municipal bankruptcies in American history"). Puerto Rico has also declared bankruptcy. Nathan
Bomey, Puerto Rico Declares Bankruptcy. Here's How It's Going to Unfold, USA TODAY (May 3,
1:39 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/05/03/puerto-rico-bankruptcy/
2017,
101243686/ [https://perma.cc/9U7D-XFXB].
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their law offices to imagine" 362 doing something like "creat[ing] public
interest units or even pursu[ing] the occasional public interest case," 363

private-public partnerships with private plaintiffs' law firms offer a
viable option. Bringing a plaintiff city claim for the most distressed
cities, where "the city government itself is no longer pursuing a vision
beyond public safety in true emergencies," 3 64 might be unrealistic, but
for all except these worst hit cities, and "[p]articularly for smaller cities,
with smaller law departments, private contractual agreements allow
cities to attempt affirmative litigation without the burden of significant
expenditures in developing the cases." 3 6 5 Indeed, "a carefullyconstructed affirmative litigation docket should pay for itself with
recouped damages, costs, and civil penalties." 366
Cities sometimes partner with plaintiffs' attorneys who have
developed particular expertise in relevant areas to help them bring
their cases. 36 7 Such arrangements are frequently done on a contingency
fee basis, a practice which has been controversial. However, at least one
court has held governmental entities can legitimately use private
counsel, "as long as the entities exercise control over the case."3 6 8
In addition to this judicial stamp of approval, these publicprivate partnerships are in fact a ubiquitous practice in public
enforcement generally, with public enforcers in a variety of domains
routinely employing outside counsel. 369 As John Coffee notes, these
362. Morris, supra note 285, at 1922.
363. Morris, supra note 1, at 191.
364. Anderson, supra note 361, at 1122.
365. Gavioli, supra note 16, at 966.
366. Morris, supra note 148, at 61.
367. This can be understood as part of coalition building generally. Tove Dannestam,
Rethinking Local Politics: Towards a Cultural Political Economy of EntrepreneurialCities, 12
SPACE & POLITY 353, 365-66 (2008):
[D]ecision-making processes take place in interactions between a variety of actors
(including private), rather than only inside the formal institutions of government.
These actors form policy networks or coalitions, based on the different kinds of
resources they bring together (material, institutional and so on). The coalitions are
often formed on an informal basis with the purpose of creating a power to act or are
centered on a specific discourse. . . . This concept highlights the idea that coalitions can
be based on a common world of imaginations, rather than on a shared interest and that
k they might exercise "discursive power" rather than generate governing capacity.
(citations omitted).
368. The California Supreme Court has so held. See Amanda Robert, Opioid Suit Is Latest
Brought by Calif. County with Help from Contingency Fee Attorneys, LEGAL NEWSLINE (July 14,
2014, 7:06 PM), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/510517879-opioid-suit-is-latest-brought-by-califcounty.html [https://perma.cc/UW8S-ZTJA].
369. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes": Myth and Reality About the
Synthesis of Private Counsel and Public Client, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 241, 242-43 (2002) ("In short,
as the stakes got higher, all sides turned to outside counsel."). He notes that the Private Securities
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enormous
partnerships are mutually beneficial and "creat[e]
370
Public actors "gain specialized human capital that they
synergy."
could not otherwise afford," and private attorneys "gain[] the
legitimacy, credibility, and home field advantage that only the state can
fee
though,
contingency
importantly,
Most
confer . . . ."371
arrangements transfer the risk of financial loss from the public to the
private. 372 Essentially, in these arrangements, "the state is ...
compensating the private attorney with lottery tickets." 3 73
In fact, even though there may be a perception that governments
have almost limitless resources, multinational corporations are often
able to rally significantly more legal and financial resources than local
governments can. For instance, even at the state level, in the Rhode
Island lead paint litigation, "there were more attorneys working for the
defense than in the entire attorney general's office." 3 7 4 Orange County's
district attorney made a similar observation about being out-staffed
and out-resourced in its pharmaceutical litigation. She noted that
"[w]hen you fight multi-billion dollar companies, we're the little guy."3 75
The multinational corporations "have substantial funds" and "try to
wear [plaintiffs] down, basically, with paperwork." 376 The corporate
behemoths that are defendants in plaintiff city cases have access to
extensive reserves of both financial and intellectual capital. Hiring
private counsel allows plaintiff cities to come closer to achieving a
symmetry of scope and scale with the massive resources of these large
corporate actors.
Through such partnerships, even financially distressed cities
can tap into plaintiff city claims as a potential source of revenue that
can help minimize the extensive expenditures resulting from the
impugned harms, without requiring significant financial investment to
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 lets a "lead plaintiff' control securities class actions. That plaintiff
is typically a state pension fund, which relies on private counsel. Id. at 242. For example, the
Federal Justice Department hired private attorney David Boies when they sued Microsoft for
antitrust violations. Id.
370. Id. at 252.
371. Id. at 242.
372. See id. at 251 ("[Tlhe contingency fee agreement is less an end run around the legislature
than a risk sharing arrangement that allocates both economic and political risks from the elected
official to the party most able to bear it: namely, the plaintiffs' attorney.").
373. Id. at 252.
374. Greenblatt, supranote 42.
375. David Whiting, Lawsuits Against Pharmaceuticals Effective Weapon in War Against
PrescriptionOpioids, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (June 8, 2017, 11:14 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/
2017/06/08/cavalry-coming-in-war-against-prescription-opioid-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/9BWFEUGL] (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Susan Kang Schroeder, Orange County
District Attorney Chief of Staff).
376. Schwartz, supra note 74.
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do so. In general, insolvent cities (or those close to it) have "very little
that [they] can do to increase revenues . . . ."377 Since "state law largely
controls eligible sources of revenue and withholds self-governance,"
"asset-poor cities" have "limited flexibility to raise revenues in creative
ways."378 Cities can see plaintiff city claims as, among other things, an
opportunity to "recover for proven injuries and use damage awards to
fund needed city services and social welfare programs." 379 This "need
for revenue is more urgent than ever due to decades of urban decline,
the new federal emphasis on local solutions to social problems, and new
demands on city revenue like the costs of homeland security." 380
Plaintiff city claims can serve as a source of revenue, one that
maps neatly onto some of the reasons for city insolvencies in the first
place. Many of the parties targeted in plaintiff city claims significantly
contributed to the city's distress: part of the very reason why many
cities are in financial distress connects to the wrongs alleged in plaintiff
city litigation. The subprime mortgage crisis, in particular, emptied
many cities' coffers. Since "the single largest source of local revenues"
is property taxes, 38 1 and the subprime mortgage crisis meant that many
residents could not pay property taxes, it had a particularly significant
effect on city finances. Between 2009 and 2010, city revenue from
property taxes fell by $11.9 billion, and between 2010 and 2011, it fell
another $14.6 billion. 382 Already-struggling cities were hit particularly
hard by this, since "long-term structural challenges and high rates of
poverty" meant that these cities depended more on property taxes and
employment related to housing than they should have or otherwise
would have. 38 3
Additionally, the subprime mortgage crisis created "steep
population loss," a phenomenon that is "dramatically bad for
budgets." 384
The housing market crashed particularly. hard in poor cities, because subprime lending
disproportionately affected poor neighborhoods and middle-class neighborhoods of color.

377. Anderson, supra note 361, at 1126.
378. Id. at 1145-46 ("For asset-poor cities . . . these constraints allow local governments
limited flexibility to raise revenues in creative ways, such as using payroll or commuter taxes to
claim revenue from persons who use the~ity (and thus, its services) during their working hours.").
379. Gavioli, supra note 16, at 942.
380. Id. at 944; see also TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPic SCRAMBLE TO GET

INSIDE OuR HEADS (2016) (describing how some municipalities are selling advertising in schools
to corporations).
381. Anderson, supra note 361, at 1128.
382. Id. at 1142.
383. Id. at 1143.
384. Id. at 1125.
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Spatially-concentrated lending patterns triggered spatially-concentrated foreclosures,
which in turn caused rising numbers of vacant and neglected homes as well as downward
385
pressure on remaining residents' housing values.

It is telling that in Michelle Wilde Anderson's study of insolvent cities,
she found that "16 of the 28" cities in insolvency were majority-minority
cities. 386 She notes that "these cities were hit extremely hard by
subprime lending. Empirical evidence has shown that such high-cost,
high-risk loans were concentrated in minority neighborhoods for
reasons beyond class and creditworthiness."3 87 Instead, "persistent
discriminatory mortgage lending," along with a history of "racially
restrictive covenants [and] white flight," is an "important cause[] of
urban decline in many majority-minority cities, including the
intensification of concentrated poverty and population loss." 3 88

Further, the high rates of poverty and the structural challenges
of many insolvent cities connect to other targeted plaintiff city claims.
For instance, Gary, Indiana, a "high-poverty, insolvent city" which is
currently grossly underpoliced, 389 has been trying, for nearly twenty

385. Id. at 1143.
386. Id. at 1140.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 1141. Cities have often participated in creating this structural inequality. Of
particular note, although Baltimore sued Wells Fargo for issuing subprime mortgages that
resulted in massive foreclosures in predominantly minority-majority areas, Wells Fargo noted:
The City's . . . own tax lien sales . . . have resulted in over 19,000 foreclosure actions
being filed against City homeowners during this same seven-year period ... The City
places liens on homes for any type of unpaid municipal bill over $100, and then sells
the liens to private investors, knowing the investors will threaten to foreclose on the
homes unless the homeowners agree to pay exorbitant fees . . . The City's tax lien sales,
moreover, have disproportionately injured minority homeowners in the City's poorest
neighborhoods. Over half of the 2006 tax lien sales based only on small unpaid water
bills or municipal fees involved properties in census tracts that are more than 80%
African-American and over two-thirds involved properties in tracts that are over 60%
African-American, but fewer than 11% involved properties in tracts that are 20% or less
African-American.
Richard E. Gottlieb & Andrew J. McGuiness, When Bad Things Happen to Good Cities:AreLenders
to Blame?, Bus. L. TODAY, July/Aug. 2008, at 12, 16 (alterations in original) (quoting Memorandum
of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 1-2, Mayor & City Council
of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 631 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2009) (No. 1:08-CV-0062BEL), 2008 WL 760447).
389. Anderson, supra note 361, at 1161-62:
The most underpoliced city in the country is the high-poverty, insolvent city of Gary,
Indiana, which has 266 officers per 100,000 population, nearly the same staffing ratio
as the 261 officers per 100,000 population in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Yet the annual
cost of crime per capita-a measure that estimates the private costs of crime, such as
injury, lost income, and stolen property-is more than 15 times higher in Gary than it
is in Cambridge. Because of this high cost of crime, the benefits of public spending on
law enforcement in Gary are dramatically higher than they are in Cambridge. Every
additional dollar spend on policing in Gary would yield $14 in benefits of reduced crime,
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years, to hold the gun industry responsible for the damages it inflicted
on that city. Back in 1999, Gary filed a public nuisance suit against
various gun dealers and manufacturers, alleging that their "negligent
marketing, deceptive advertising, and negligent design . .
increased
violent crimes and required [Gary] to pay more for crime-related
expenditures." 390 The now-bankrupt cities of Detroit and Camden had
also brought gun litigation. 391 "Fairness dictates that cities, which
[despite their current struggles] overwhelmingly produce the wealth of
this country," 392 should not be left with the disproportionate financial
burdens that others' misconduct has visited upon them. Through
partnering with private attorneys, these distressed cities that have
been injured by the various forms of misconduct targeted in plaintiff
city claims can and should pursue claims against them.
IV. LITIGATION AS STATE BUILDING

Even the new "minimal" cities, 393 by partnering with private
firms, may find that bringing forward plaintiff city claims is in fact
financially feasible and can help to recoup some of the expenses that
cities undertake in trying to address or stem these impugned harms.
But economic impact is not the only meaningful yardstick by which to
judge the desirability of a particular course of action. 394 Other factors,
like furthering goals of equality and enhancing the quality of life for all
city citizens, also matter. 395 In fact, in the current contemporary context
of social inequality, increasingly concentrated poverty, and growing
political alienation, "attention to justice-not only economic efficiencyas the criterion for evaluating urban policies is more important than
ever." 396 Along with fiscal concerns, municipal decisionmaking should
whereas every new dollar spent on policing in Cambridge would yield only 30 cents in
such benefits.
(footnotes omitted).
390. Ausness, supranote 15, at 851.
391. See id. at 840 ("[A] number of local governments brought suit against gun manufacturers
to recover for gun-related expenses. The plaintiffs included ... Camden County ...
and Detroit."
(footnote omitted)).
392. Gavioli, supra note 16, at 967.
393. See generallyAnderson, supra note 361 (discussing new "minimal" cities).
394. Susan S. Fainstein, Planning and the Just City, in SEARCHING FOR THE JUST CITY:
DEBATES IN URBAN THEORY AND PRACTICE 19, 28-29 (Peter Marcuse et al. eds., 2009).
395. Id.
396. Justin Steil & James Connolly, The Just City, in THE WILEY-BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF URBAN AND REGIONAL STUDIES (Anthony M. Orum ed., forthcoming May 2018),
https://steil.mit.edusites/default/files/documents/Steil%2Connolly%2Forthcoming%2The%20
[https://perma.cc/JAF4-AHBZ]
Just%20City%2OEncyc%2OUrban%20Regional%2OStudies.pdf
(emphasis added).
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also be governed by questions like "whether actions are consistent with
democratic norms, whether their outcomes enhance the capabilities of
the comparatively disadvantaged, and whether they recognize and
respect who benefits from a [particular] policy" or course of action. 39 7
The decision to engage in plaintiff city litigation reflects a
consideration of these additional criteria, and a rejection of the stark
"ideology and practice of market primacy." 398 Taking this political
position is part of a larger process of cities forging their political identity
through their litigative activities. Through serving as plaintiff cities,
cities are establishing themselves as entities responsible for and
capable of achieving justice for their populations. In other words,
plaintiff cities are using litigation "as a source of statebuilding." 399 The
litigation is a means through which cities construct themselves as
meaningful political entities. 400 By taking on litigation similar to that
which is sometimes taken on by states in the public interest, cities are
defining themselves as like states, as governmental entities that can
and will act on behalf of vulnerable constituencies.
Perhaps ironically, the inertia and gridlock that has occurred at
multiple levels of government has helped to create the political space
for this kind of local state building to occur. The inability of states, "the
to address the
nation-state[, and] the transnational corporation ...
political alienation and economic instability felt by many citizens in the
U.S. and elsewhere" 401 has left an opening for public-interest minded
cities. State-building moments often coincide with shifting "boundaries
between public and private," 402 and cities, with their lack of the full
panoply of "public" powers (like parens patriae, for example),
nevertheless manage to make good use of this space. Plaintiff city
litigation straddles the border between public and private: a public
actor brings the claim, but with virtually no special public actor
privileges. Instead, plaintiff cities resourcefully use private law tools to

397. Id.
398. Schragger, supra note 9, at 95.
399. See MEGAN MING FRANCIS, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN AMERICAN

STATE 13 n.34 (2014) (describing FARHANG, supra note 335). In some ways, the plaintiff city
phenomenon may be a flip of the enforcement dynamic that Sean Farhang analyzed. See FARHANG,
supranote 335. Rather than private actors enforcing public law, which was the subject of his study,
plaintiff cities could be understood as public actors enforcing private law.
400. In so doing, plaintiff city litigation acts as a "form of state building in which courts and
judges-sometimes even the mere existence or threat of them-play a crucial role." Staszak, supra
note 93, at 78.
401. Schragger, supra note 9, at 95.
402. Carol Nackenoff & Julie Novkov, Introduction to STATEBUILDING FROM THE MARGINS:

BETWEEN RECONSTRUCTION AND THE NEW DEAL 1, 1 (Carol Nackenoff & Julie Novkov eds., 2014).
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help offer their citizens a different form of justice-seeking and
governance.
By stepping into this void, and trying to solve harms like climate
change, gun violence, and opioid addiction, harms that directly impact
localities but are by no means unique to them, cities are pushing against
another boundary: the idea of "natural and static layers of political and
territorial organization." 4 03 The local, state, national, and international
spheres are not static and immutable, but are instead "socially
constructed in negotiations and struggles between different actors." 404
There is, accordingly, continual contestation of the boundaries and
appropriate sphere of activity for local, state, federal, and global
levels.405
Plaintiff city litigation represents one such contestation.
Plaintiff cities are using the litigative pursuit of redressing wrongs
which are simultaneously both local and large-scale as a form of state
building. This is part of the larger project of the "on-going [self]construction of 'the city' as a relevant [and increasingly important]
political category." 406 The litigation can be seen as part of a general
movement of municipal empowerment and maturation, and as a
renegotiation of the meaning of a city, both in a theoretical and practical
sense. "Political entities, such as cities and regions, are gaining in
importance," 407 and at least "[i]n the international literature, there is a
near consensus that fundamental changes in the policy orientation of
local governments are occurring." 408 Cities are scaling up: they now pass
regulations about national social issues, publicly take stances on
international issues, agree to international protocols, and collaborate to
form vast municipal networks that span the nation and beyond. Indeed,
networks inform much of plaintiff city litigation, as cities share
strategies, expertise, and sometimes the same private counsel.409
Such coalitions allow cities to "becom[e] actors on different
political levels, linked together in various networks which increasingly
bypass the nation-state." 4 10 In the United States, for instance, former
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg has pledged $200 million to
fund the American Cities Initiative, a foundation "which aims to

403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Dannestam, supra note 367, at 366.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 356.
See supra note 55.
Dannestam, supra note 367, at 353-54.
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empower city governments and mayors to innovate and solve problems,
such as gun violence, climate change and addiction." 4 1 1 Such alliances
may become "instrumental in the creation of new public powers and
administrative capacities." 4 1 2
A. Constructingthe Polis
At the same time as many plaintiff cities are scaling up, plaintiff
city litigation is also deeply and fundamentally rooted in the on-theground, lived realities and experiences of localities and their
constituencies. The attention to the harms that vulnerable individuals
and populations suffer is a key feature of plaintiff city claims, and an
important part of their state-building effect. Plaintiff city claims have
important framing, shaping, and relational functions. They frame the
harmed individuals underlying them into a population or a collectivity,
and not just any collectivity, but one with stature and dignity that the
city will defend. The claims that plaintiff cities bring can be viewed as
defensive, as a "cry of protest" 4 1 3 made to defend particularly vulnerable
groups from the injuries inflicted by various corporate actors. In
recognizing that these groups are not disposable, and demanding
redress for the harms that impact those populations, cities are
affirming the place and inherent value of these groups within the polity
itself. The claims create the city as "a polis, a political collectivity, a
place where public interest is defined and realized," 414 and define that
political collectivity to decisively include often marginalized groups.
By so doing, plaintiff city claims can help to reduce the "legal
estrangement" that some minority groups may otherwise experience. 415
"Legal estrangement" is a concept that incorporates both "objective
structural conditions" and the "legal cynicism" that results from those
conditions-the "cultural orientation.. . in which the law and the

411. Kurtis Lee, Q&A: MichaelBloomberg Talks Gun Control, Empowering Cities and Trump:
'I Was a Manager, He Was Not,' L.A. TIMES (July 28, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-pol-michael-bloomberg-20170728-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cclM3JB-N9X3].
412. Nackenoff & Novkov, supra note 402, at 1, 4.
413. Bernstein, supra note 334, at 37.
414. Mustafa Dikeg, Justice and the Spatial Imagination, in SEARCHING FOR THE JUST CITY,
supra note 394, at 72, 83 (quoting ETIENNE BALIBAR, tCRITS POUR ALTHUSSER 66 (1991)).
415. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantlingof Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J.
2054, 2066 (2017).
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agents of its enforcement, such as the police and courts, are viewed as
illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill equipped to ensure public safety." 416
Legal estrangement is concerned with the exclusionary aspects of
contemporary regimes, and how such regimes often "operate to
effectively banish whole communities from the body politic."4 17
Legal estrangement also considers the "signaling function of . .
law to groups about their place in society." 4 18 Often, the signal to
vulnerable or minority groups (sometimes even sent by cities
themselves, in different contexts) is one of "symbolic community
exclusion." 419 There is often "legal closure, a means of hoarding legal
resources for the socially and socioeconomically advantaged" while
simultaneously "locking marginalized groups out of the benefits of law
enforcement." 4 2 0
Plaintiff city litigation resists this legal estrangement. 421
Instead, it "reassure[s] community members that society has not
abandoned them, that they are engaged in a collective project of making
the social world." 4 2 2 These benefits accrue even when plaintiff city
litigation is unsuccessful. 423 Even when plaintiff cities do not ultimately
emerge legally victorious, the signaling function and communitybuilding impact remains. Further, they signal to corporate wrongdoers
that cities are willing to litigate these kinds of claims, which itself may
encourage corporations to engage in less injurious behaviors.
B. Creating the Just City
Plaintiff city claims may bring cities one step closer towards the
aspirational goal of the "just city." 42 4 The just city seeks to overcome

"the injustices that have come with rapid urbanization-the violence,

416. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting David S. Kirk & Andrew V. Papachristos,
CulturalMechanisms and the Persistence of Neighborhood Violence, 116 AM. J. Soc. 1190, 1191
(2011)).
417. Id. at 2067.
418. Id. at 2088.
419. Id. at 2099.
420. Id. at 2114-15.
421. This may be an example of tort law building community in a different way. For a
discussion of community values in tort, see Christina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126
YALE L.J. 1321 (2017).
422. Bell, supra note 415, at 2085 (discussing "law that is well designed and properly
enforced").
423. In fact, other benefits often accompany losing. See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through
Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 941 (2011) (identifying "social movement effects rooted in the unique
attributes of litigation loss").
424. SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN, THE JUST CITY 23 (2010).
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insecurity, exploitation, and poverty that characterize urban life for
many, as well as the physical expressions of unequal access to social,
cultural, political, and economic capital that arise from intertwined
divisions between race, class, and gender categories." 425 Three
lodestars-equity, diversity, and democracy 42 6-guide cities out of this
unhappy state, and towards a "richer account of democratic life" 4 2 7 for
their citizens.
Although usually theorized as a trio of useful directives for
urban planning, plaintiff cities show that litigation can play an
important role in furthering these objectives, as well. First, plaintiff city
claims can advance the goal of equity. Equity is similar to equality, but
differs in that equity is a "realistic" goal which acknowledges that urban
policies do not unilaterally have the capacity to create equality writ
large. 4 28 Like equality, though, equity demands distributive justice, and
insists that municipal public policy decisions must benefit more than

just the already well-off. 4 29
Second, plaintiff city claims affirm the value of diversity.
Diversity here "go[es] beyond encouraging acceptance of others to
include the social composition of places" and focuses on building
capacity for all community members. 430
Finally, democracy "invokes the idea of meaningful public
participation and reasoned public deliberation about the best measures
to secure the general community interest." 431 Meaningful participation
is only possible if populations are "healthy enough to participate in civil
life and pursue their own life's goals." 432 Plaintiff city claims, and their
attempted protection of public health, try to ensure this circumstance.
The "'ecological' model of health" has demonstrated that "socially,
culturally, and materially disadvantaged people live shorter, less
healthy lives," 4 33 and are often unable to vigorously participate in civic
425. James Connolly & Justin Steil, Introductionto SEARCHING FOR THE JUST CITY, supranote
394, at 1, 8.
426. FAINSTEIN, supra note 424, at 23.
427. Schragger, supranote 9, at 132.
428. FAINSTEIN, supra note 424, at 36.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 67.
431. David A. Dana, Public Interest and PrivateLawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation of
Parens Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 322 (2001). But, as Dan
Kahan noted in his brilliantly titled piece Democracy Shmemocracy, "democracy is an essentially
contested concept: there is not just one, but rather a plurality of competing conceptions of
democracy, each of which emphasizes a different good commonly associated with democratic
political regimes." Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L.J. 795, 795 (1999).
432. PARMET, supra note 259, at 1.
433. Wiley, supra note 25, at 222.
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life. 4 3 4 Plaintiff city claims try to stop this cycle, and give political

expression to "a right to inclusion and social responsibility-a right that
suggests that one's illness . ..

[or injury] is not solely one's own

concern," 435 but the concern of a just polity as well. Like most public
health litigation, plaintiff city claims "ha[ve] an important role to play
in the political struggle to protect the rights of the community and its
more vulnerable members." 436 Through this litigation, cities are state
building and constructing themselves in the image of the just city.
CONCLUSION

Plaintiff cities rise on the swell of two developing strands, one
political, and one legal. At the political level, cities are in a moment of
emergent state building. Cities are becoming increasingly important
actors, and citizens are increasingly expecting their local governments
to further their opportunity for human flourishing. "[T]he city is the
scale where questions of justice are felt concretely as part of everyday
life,"437 and as nimble and often progressive public actors, cities are
well-positioned to bring claims to redress injuries from harms like lead
paint toxicity, the subprime mortgage crisis, and the opioid epidemic.
Indeed, "the public health threats of an era have always found
their way before the courts and lawmaking bodies of the time,"438
usually through tort law. "[T]ort law showcases the most salient
activities or agents of disease and injury in an era": the railroad cases
of the nineteenth century gave way to the motor vehicle claims of the
early twentieth, and then to the toxic chemical cases as that century
came to a close. 439 In this new millennium, mammoth economic harms,
like those at issue in the financial crisis, and massive health harms, like
those of the opioid epidemic, demand a response. As with the harms of
eras past, tort law will almost inevitably be asked to grapple with these
injuries and will also almost inevitably change and develop "as a result
of [this] encounter." 440
Plaintiff cities find themselves at the nexus of these two
evolutions. The claims are legitimate-legally, politically and
sociologically-but it remains to be seen whether they will ultimately
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

Cf. supranotes 311-315 and accompanying text.
Parmet, supra note 89, at 1711-12.
Id. at 1665.
Connolly & Steil, supra note 425, at 6.
PARMET, supra note 259, at 37.
Id. at 36.
Id.
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lead to legal victory. At the very least though, advancing these claims
expressively communicates to the vulnerable populations who are most
harmed by these wrongs, to society writ large, and to corporate and
industrial actors, that these wrongs will not go unnoted. This
communicated "[a]wareness of exploitation, and [the] attempt[ ] to
challenge it, bring us closer to realizing the too often unfulfilled promise
that cities have long represented-the promise of liberation and
opportunity."4 1 Plaintiff cities are not, by any means, perfect cities, but
their litigative acts press for political recognition, both for vulnerable
populations within the polis, and for the city itself.

441. Connolly & Steil, supra note 425, at 1.

